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The Legislative Council, which is composed of five Senators,
six Representatives, and the presiding officers of the two
houses, serves as a continuing research agency for the legislature through the maintenance of a trained staff. Between
sessions, research activities are concentrated on the study of
relatively broad problems formally proposed by legislators, and
the publication and distribution of factual reports to aid in
their solution.
During the sessions, the emphasis is on supplying legislators, on individual request, with personal memoranda, providing
them with information needed to handle their own legislative
problems. Reports and memoranda both give pertinent data in the
form of facts, figures, arguments, and alternatives.
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To Members of the Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly:
In accordance with the directives of House Joint
Resolution No. 1024, 1965 regular session, the Legislative
Council submits the accompanying report and recommendations prepared by its Committee on Tax Exempt PropertI
concerning clarifications or changes in the constitut on
and statutes relating to property tax exemptions.
The report and recommendations of the committee appointed to carry out the study were approved by the Council
at its meeting on November 28, 1966, for transmission to
the members of the Forty-sixth General Assembly.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Senator Floyd Oliver

Chairman

FO/mp

iii

OFFICE~S

Sen, Floyd Ollvar
Chc:,lrmon
Rep, C.P, (Doc) Lamb
Vice Chairman

COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Lt.

STAFF

Lyle C. Kyle
Director
Phllllp E. Jones
Senior Analrst
David F, Morr ssey
Senior Arialyst
Janet Wll son
Research Associate

M~uaeru

Gov, Robert L,

l<nou1

Sen. Foy t>e8ercird
Sen. Wllllcsm 0. Lenflo•
Sen. Vlncerit Massari
Sen, Rvth S, Stockton

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

M. Weber
Research Assistant .

Roger

ROOM 341, STATE CAPITOL
DENVER, COLORADO 80203
222- 9911 • EXTENSION 2285

SPe<1l«er Alten Dines
~ep, fllrrast 0, Burns
Rep, Richard G1,O.bhardt
Rep. Harrie I:. Hart
Rep, Mark A.. Ho~n
Rep, John R. P. Wheeler

November 29, 1966
Senator Floyd Oliver, Chairman
Colorado Legislative Council
Room 341, State Capitol
Denver, Colorado
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your committee appointed to carry out the studies
requested by House Joint Resolution No. 1024. 1965 regular session, relating to tax exempt properties, submits
herewith its final report and recommendations.
House Joint Resolution No. 1024, 1965 regular session, specifically directed the committee to review
possible clarification or changes in the constitution and
statutes relating to tax exempt propertys. needed improvement in the administration of the statutes; and revision
of the system of keeping public records on exemptions
heretofore granted, as well as current exemptions. The
committee devoted this time to a review of exemptions on
public property and private educational, religious, and
charitable properties.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Senator Ruth Stockton
Chairman, Committee on Tax
Exempt Property
RS/mp
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FOREWORD
Pursuant to the directives of House Joint Resolution No.
1024, 1965 regular session, the Legislative Council appointed the
following committee to conduct the study of tax exempt property
in Colorado:
Sen.
Rep.
Sen.
Sen.

Ruth Stockton, Chairman
Harold Adcock, Vice Chairman
John Bermingham
Fay DeBerard

Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.

Joseph V. Calabrese
James LaHaye
Hiram A. McNeil
Robert Schafer

The resolution specifically directed the committee to review possible clarification or changes in the constitution and
statutes relating to tax exempt property; needed improvement in
the administration of the statutes; and revision of the system of
keeping public records on exemptions heretofore granted, as well
as current exemptions. The committee established two phases for
the study. The first phase, the 1965 interim study, was devoted
to a review of the constitutional exemption granted to publicly
owned property. The second phase, the 1966 interim study, was devoted to a review of statutory exemptions and private educational,
religious, and charitable properties.
Assisting the committee in the study were Mr. Jim Wilson of
the Legislative Reference Office, members of the Colorado Tax
Commission, and Mr. Dave Morrissey of the Council staff.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

November 29, 1966
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since 1963 the Legislative Council Committee on Tax Exempt
Property has wrestled with the problems of tax exemptions for
various classes of property. In order to focus on the impact of
exP.mptions, the committee requested the Council staff to develop an
inventory of property exemptions in Colorado. Early in this study
it became apparent that records of county assessors with respect to
exempt properties were woefully inadequate, and the Tax Commission
now is in the process of updating the tax exempt records of the
county assessors.
A preliminary estimate of the value of tax exempt property
in Colorado was completed by the Council staff in December of 1964.
This estimate reveals that the major portion of tax exempt properties are under federal, state, and municipal ownership. The
minin,um estimated assessed value of federal, state, and municipal
properties approximates $533,000,000 or 65.3 per cent of all tax
exempt property in Colorado. (This figure does not include facilities for higher education which were reported separately.) Because
of the relatively large amount of public exempt property, the
cornmi:i.ttee concentrated its efforts in this area in 1965.
Public Property
Since the Constitution of the state was adopted, it has
contained a provision exempting public property from ad valorem
taxes (Article X, Section 4). According to the decisions of the
Colorado Supreme Court, Article X, Section 4, means that all properties of the state, cities and towns, counties, public libraries,
and other municipal corporations are exempt from ad valorem taxes
regardless of ttuse"; "ownership" is the only criterion for granting
an ad valorem exemption for public property.! Furthermore, in
1961 the General Assembly made an unsuccessful attempt to minimize
the impact of the state's acquisition of private taxable lands by
requiring the payment of fees in lieu of taxes on lands removed
from the tax rolls by the purchases of the Game, Fish, and Parks
Department. The Colorado Supreme Court declared this act unconstitutional -- Game and Fish Commission of Colorado v. Cleland N.
Feast, et al (1965), No. 20489. Thus a constitutional amendment is
needed if the General Assembly is to exercise discretion with respect to tax exemptions on public property.
The acquisition of large tracts of taxable land in certain
counties in Colorado by state, municipal, and other local units of

L,

.Stewart y_. City and County of Denver (1921),. 70 Co-lo. 514.
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government has reduced the tax base of a number of counties. The
committee recognizes that purchases of taxable land by government
units often are made in the general interest of the over-all economy
of the state; however, the committee is concerned that benefits
derived are obtained at the expense of communities in which the acquisitions are made. For instance, despite the fact that tax exempt
lands are removed from the tax rolls, usually there is no corresponding reduction in the need for miscellaneous county services,
schools, fire and police protection, etc., and there even may be an
increase in the need for these services. Therefore, any reduction
in the tax base often adds to the mill levies of existing property
tax payers. In this manner, continuing governmental expenses for
services to the tax exempt property actually is borne by the taxpayers of the county in which the land is purchased.
Committee Recommendations
The committee believes that the burden resulting from erosion
of the tax base of a local community must be considered as part of
the expense for obtaining tax exempt property and should be met by
the community deriving benefit from the acquisition of the property.
With this in mind, the committee reaffirms its 196~ recommendation
for a proposed constitutional amendment to allow the General Assembly to provide for payments in lieu of taxes in the event the
tax base of a local community is adversely affected by removal of
land from the tax rolls by state and local governmental units. The
committee again recommends that Article X, Section 4, Colorado
Constitution, be amended as follows:
Section 4. Public property exempt - except.
The property, real and personal, of the state,
counties, cities, towns, and other municipal AND
QUASI-MUNICIPAL corporations, and public libraries
shall be exempt from taxation, PROVIDED, THAT tHE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY PROVIDE BY LAW FOR THE MAKING
OF PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES WITH RESPECT TO ANY
SUCH PROPERTY.
Private Religious, Charitable, and
Educational Property
Article X, Section 5, Colorado Constitution, provides:
"Property, real and personal, that is used solely and exclusively
for religious worship, for schools or for strictly charitable
purposes, also cemeteries not used or held for private or corporate
profit, shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided by
general law." The provision "unless otherwise provided by general
law" gives discretion to the General Assembly to limit or qualify
exemptions on private real property. As previously mentioned,
similar discretionary power is lacking with respect to public properties. Although the General Assembly has authority to limit .
exemptions on private real property, the power to extend exemptions
xii

to "homesteadsu and residences of aged persons is prohibited.
Article X, Section 6, Colorado Constitution, states: "All laws
exempting from taxation, property other than that heretofore mentioned, shall be void; ••• " In any event, with the exception of
adding a definition for schools and requiring "ownership" as a prerequisite for obtaining a property tax exemption, the General
Assembly has accepted the provisions of Article X, Section 5, without reservation.2
Impact of Private Tax Exempt Real Property
Exemptions for private religious, charitable, and educational
properties comprise about 15 per cent of the tax exempt property in
Colorado (see Research Publication 102, Colorado Legislative
Council). If this property were added to the tax rolls, the estimated tax base of counties, municipalities, and school districts
would be increased by only three per cent. Although this burden
appears to be relatively insignificant as a state total, the impact
to individual counties and cities could be appreciable. For instance, latest available estimates of the assessed value of private
tax exempt property in the City and County of Denver totals
$70,000,000 or 6.6 per cent of the tax base of the community.
In the April, 1966, issue of The National Civic Review,3 it
was reported that housing projects sponsored by churches, labor
unions, and other nonprofit organizations probably would account
for a rapidly growing share of homebuilding activity in the next
few years. Three reasons are cited: 1) the Senior Citizen Housing
Act: -- Public Law 87-723 -- passed by Congress, 2) a growing
public awareness of the need for adequate housing for the elderly
and disadvantaged, and 3) an increase in the number of nonprofit
groups entering the housing field. Substantiating these findings
is the recent growth in senior citizen "high rise" apartments in
the urban areas of Colorado. Since the advent of the federal legislation in 1962, the original cost value of these homes for the
elderly has exceeded $25,000,000.
Property tax exemptions for private institutions traditionally are based on two assumptions: 1) if the se4vices were not
performed by a private agency, the burdens of government would increase; and 2) tax exemptions foster moral, cultural, and social
development of the community. Separation of church and state also
is considered a fundamental purpose in granting property tax
exemptions to religious organizations. In any event. the state of
Colorado recognizes the worthiness of certain types of activities

2.
3.

Section 137-2-1? C.R.S. 1963, as amended.
National Civic Review, April 1966, page 225.
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and has attempted to encourage these programs through a subsidy,
that is, exemption from ad valorem taxes. The committee is concerned, however, that the subsidy fostered at the state level is
not supported by the over-all revenue sources of the state; rather,
the subsidy for this state program is borne by the tax base of
local government. The reason for this is that the property tax is
the prime source of revenue for local government. In 1965, property taxes levied in Colorado amounted to $34,344,328 for cities
and towns, $63,623,246 for counties, and $186,252,599 for public
schools. The Local Affairs Study Commission also reports that from
38 per cent to 50 per cent of all local government revenues are
derived from property taxes.
In a sense, the General Assembly has recognized that the ad
valorem tax base is not sufficient to meet all the needs of local
government, and that tax exemptions granted at the state level reduce the effectiveness of the property tax. The General Assembly
has minimized this adverse impact to one sector of local government
-- schools -- through the "School Foundation Act." The formula for
the distribution of state school monies is based on local effort
encompassing property tax valuations and adjusted gross income as
measures of local ability to pay. Thus local communities with a
relatively large amount of exempt property receive a proportionately higher amount of state school monies.
On the other hand, cities and towns receive little in the way
of state support. Article X, Section 7, prohibits the General
Assembly from imposing taxes for the purposes of any county, city,
town or other municipal corporation, but authority may be vested
with municipal corporations to assess and collect taxes for the support of local government. Municipalities must maintain services
at a level that meets the needs of the exempt institutions. It is
true that some of the direct services to exempt institutions are
supported through a system of fees or charges. The nature of the
service usually determines whether tax exempt institutions pay for
benefits received. Benefits of municipal water and power services,
for instance, easily may be assessed on a fee basis according to the
quantity of service provided. Trash collection costs and special
assessments for curbs, streets, gutters, and paving also are collected from exempt institutions. Finally, tax exempt institutions
contribute to the costs of municipal services through building
permit fees and charges for land use variances.
Alternate Suggestions to Reduce the Impact of Tax Exemptions
Fees in Lieu of Taxes. A number of alternate suggestions
were made to the committee to reduce the impact of tax exempt property on local government. First of all, the committee explored
the possibility of expanding.the present system ~f f~es in lieu of
taxes on certain types of private property. Again, it must be kept
in mind that any proposed legislation could no~ be.extended.to .
include public properties in view of the constitutional limitation
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prohibiting modification of the exemption for public properties.

The committee called upon the expertise of the Colorado Municipal
League to assist in an exploration of service charges in lieu of
taxes for exempt charitable, religious, and educational properties.
With this in mind, a major role of municipal government is
to protect property -- police and fire fighting services, ordinance
enforcement, planning and zoning, and nuisance regulation. Although
these activities of local government are of direct benefit to all
property owners, measurement of value received cannot be computed in
the same manner as a simple meter reading for water or electric
power consumption. Nevertheless, these services are essential to
owners of both taxable property and owners of tax exempt property.
Other governmental activities of benefit to nontaxable institutions
include: street maintenance, street cleaning and lighting, snow
removal, and transportation services.
Problems Posed bfi Service Charges. Perhaps an initial roadblock to the "service c arge concept" is Article X, Section 3,
Colorado Constitution. In part, this section provides: "All taxes
shall be uniform upon each of the various classes of real and personal property located within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, which shall prescribe such methods and regulations as shall secure just and equalized valuations for assessments
of taxes upon all property, real and personal, located within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, ••• " Measurement
and equalization of costs of governmental services based on a service charge rated according to benefits received on the one hand and
a general tax on the other would be extremely difficult to achieve.
How could uniformity be achieved if one segment of the population
pays a general tax, based on assessed valuation of property, while
another group pays a specific fee according to benefits received?
As previously mentioned, municipal services directly affect
property owners. Perhaps the following list of functions of city
and town government may best illustrate the types of services available to property owners:

!l

Water*
Sewer*
Electricity*
Public Works Administration
A) Street paving, curbs, gutters, etc. (special
assessments)*
Bl Street cleaning
Snow removal
Street lighting

g

*Functions in which institutions exempt from ad valorem taxes pay
service charges, fees, or special assessments.
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5)

Planning and zoning
A) Construction permits*
B) Variance of land use regulations*

6

Nuisance regulation
Fire protection
Police protection
Sanitation*
Transportation
Ordinance enforcement
Libraries
Parks and recreation facilities
General administration

7
8
9

10
11

12
13

14

Segregation of the aforementioned items into areas of direct
benefit to tax exempt property owners is difficult. Certainly it
is easier to justify assessment of costs for fire and police services to the exempt institutions than services of libraries, parks,
and over-all costs of city administration. Nevertheless, to some
degree, most of the functions enumerated above provide some service
to tax exempt property owners.
Assuming that constitutional objections to service charges
could be met, a system of service fees certainly might add to the
complexity of local government administration, and in view of the
fact that an aggregate increase of local revenues of only three per
cent would result if all private exempt institutions were placed on
the tax rolls, the amount of revenue derived from a service charge
program probably would not be sufficient to offset the administrative costs involved.
Non-school Taxes For Exempt Properties. In view of the problems posed by fees, a second sugges~ion was made to the committee
to recommend requiring private tax exempt institutions to pay nonschool property taxes. The suggestion was made on the basis that
elimination of school taxes would reduce the major burden of property taxes, while not forcing a reduction in the tax base of towns
and counties. State aid to schools would continue to offset the
reduction to the property tax base for schools.
In viewing this suggestion, the committee expressed concern
with the impact of nonschool taxes on the tax exempt institutions.
Municipal, general county, and special improvement property
levies in 1965 totaled $97,967,000. An increase of three per cent,

*Functions in which institutions exempt from ad valorem taxes pay
service charges, fees, or special assessments.
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or $2,939,000 probably would result if private exempt institutions
were added to the tax rolls of cities, counties (excluding general
county school taxes), and special districts. Although the increased
revenue to local governments does not appear to be substantial, the
impact to individual exempt institutions would be significant. For
instance, municipal mill levies range from 1.70 mills in Bonanza to
46.00 mills in Cripple Creek and Victor, Colorado. In comparison,
the average municipal mill levy reported by the Tax Commission in
1965 is 14.72 mills. Other cities and towns with mill levies in excess of 30 mills include: Central City (42.00), Crested Butte
(37.35), De Beque (32.00), Erie (37.89), Frederick (35.00). Frisco
(31.00), Genoa (32.62), Hayden (33.25), Log Lane Village (35.60),
Meade (33.39), Milliken (33.00), Ouray (34.00), Rangely (40.00), Red
Cliff (44.69), and Silverton (39.00).
For the most part, the smaller cities and towns lean more
heavily on the property tax for support than the larger communities.
For example, the mill levies in the ten largest cities in Colorado
in 1965 were as follows: Denver (14.60), Pueblo (19.00), Colorado
Springs (19.38), Aurora (10.50), Boulder (9.70), Englewood (15.30),
Arvada (13.00), Greeley (17.75), Fort Collins (15.09), Grand Junction (15.00), and Littleton (10.70). Total general government
operating revenues in the City and County of Denver in 1964 amounted
to $76,787,000; $26,168,000 or 34.l per cent of that total revenue
was derived from property taxes.
Requiring private tax exempt institutions to pay property
taxes for nonschool purposes would result in a state-wide average
property tax to private religious, charitable, and educational institutions of 34.47 per cent of the property tax levies on current
taxable property.
Clarification of Standards for Granting Tax Exemptions. The
third and final major suggestion made to the committee involved
re-examination of the standards by which institutions qualify for
tax exempt status. As pointed out by Mr. Carper, Tax Commissioner,
at the March 29 meeting of the committee:
•.. the constitution contains four lines for the
exemption of charitable, religious, and educational property. Similarly, the statutes contain
only 13 lines with respect to the exemption of
private property. Thus the criteria for exemption of charitable and religious property is outlined in the Constitution and statutes as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court. Since the
Court has followed a liberal rule of construction
on ruling on exempt status of religious, charitable, and educational properties, are the guidelines established by the Supreme Court valid
today? Is there a need for redefining what constitutes a charity?
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Prior to 1961, the county assessors were charged with the
responsibility for granting tax exemptions to religious, charitable,
and educational institutions. It would be safe to say that within
the guidelines of court decisions there were 63 different bases for
granting tax exemptions. Chapter 260, Session Laws of Colorado
1961, vested authority with the Tax Commission to determine the
propriety of exemptions in Colorado. The Commission is in the pro•
cess of reviewing every ad valorem tax exemption for charitable,
religious, and educational property in Colorado, as well as granting
or denying all new applications for exemptions. In order to review
the basis of decisions made by the Commission, the committee staff
reviewed 1191 claims filed with the Commission.
Basis Upon Which Exemptions Are Granted
The exemptions granted by the Tax Commission closely follow
the rulings of the Colorado Supreme Court, and, in the event the
Court has not ruled on a specific major class of property, such as
"senior citizen housing," the Commission usually requests the advice of the Attorney General. A detailed analysis of Supreme Court
decisions upon which the Tax Commission has based a number of its
decisions is contained in the accompanying staff report. In general, the determination of what constitutes a charity poses the most
difficult question for the Commission. Mr. Howard Latting, Chairman
of the Colorado Tax Commission, suggested that the following six
qualifications are essential conditions for an organization to be
granted a tax exemption as a charity in Colorado:
1)

the organization is nonprofit;

2)

no part of the net earnings of the organization
inures to any private shareholder or individual;

3)

the exempt property is used for the actual operation of the claimed exempt activity;

4)

the property is not used or operated by the owner
or any other person so as to benefit anyone
through the distribution of profits, payment of
excessive charges or compensations or the more
advantageous pursuit of their business or profession;

5)

the property is not used for fraternal or lodge
purposes or for social club purposes unless such
use is purely incidental to the charitable
activities for which the exemption is claimed;
and

6)

all properties of the corporation are irrevocably

dedicated to charitable purposes and upon liquida-

tion of the corporation, no benefits will inure

xviii

to any private person, but shall be transferred
to some other nonprofit charitable organization.
Extent of Exemptions. Once a decision is made that an institution qualifies as a charitable, religious, or educational activity, the Tax Commission must then determine that the property
actually is used for the purpose for which the exemption is granted.
In other words, a church or charitable activity which owns income
property or even vacant land held for future development can not
qualify for a property tax exemption for such property. Also the
Commission constantly is faced with property usage which is related
to the activities or functions of the exempt institution but which
may not be essential to the purpose. For instance, are parking lots
essential to the conduct of church services? The Commission has
ruled that when a parking lot is used solely for the exempt activity,
a property tax exemption may be granted. However, if parking spaces
are leased for other reasons, the exemption is denied. In conclusion, the committee agrees with the strict interpretations of the
Tax Commission that the use of the property must be essential to the
purpose for which the exemption is granted, if a property tax exemption is to be allowed. The committee applauds the decisions of the
Commission and supports continued efforts to interpret the law in a
strict manner.
Senior Citizen Housing. Perhaps the most controversial area
of tax exemptions reviewed by the committee involved senior citizen
housing. The Federal Housing Authority under Public Law 87-723
provides low interest loans to nonprofit corporations to assist in
developing low-cost housing for the elderly. Specifically, the
federal act is designed to encourage the development of new or rehabilitated living units which are for the use of elderly persons
(over 62 years of age) or handicapped persons. Following enactment
of Public Law 87-723 in 1962, charitable, religious, and trade
associations have established a number of senior citizen homes in
the urban areas of Colorado. The estimated total fixed assets of
these homes is in excess of $25,000,000.
Charges were made to the committee that some senior citizen
homes were being constructed as luxury-type apartments and that the
income of a number of dwellers was above average. Furthermore, it
was brought to the attention of the committee that in order to
achieve full occupancy, units were being rented to physically able
persons under 62 years of age. In other words, standards were not
being met either as to income or age. Many of the senior citizen
homes also require an occupancy fee ranging from $600 to $8,000,
suggesting that little consideration is given to the destitute.
For these reasons, charitable tax exemptions for senior citizen
homes are being questioned.
On the other hand, after careful analysis of the concept of
charity as outlined by the Colorado Supreme Court decisions and a
recent California court decision, Fifield Manor v. County of Los
Angeles (1961), 10 Cal. 242, the Tax Commission, fortified with an
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opinion of the Attorney General, ruled that senior citizen homes
qualify as a charitable activity for the purpose of obtaining an ad
valorem tax exemption in Colorado.
The Fifield Case appears to be especially pertinent to Colorado in view of the similarity of constitutional provisions of
Colorado and California with respect to charitable property tax
exemptions. The California District Court of A~peals ruled
in Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 10 Cal. Reporter
242, that nonprofit corporations were entitled to property tax exemption for property devoted to homes for the aged, although occupied mainly by middle income persons who had been self-employed,
and where charges did not yield more than actual costs. The court
concluded:
The courts have long recognized and declared
that charity is not limited to giving alms, is
not confined to relief of the poor, may extend to
the rich in areas where they are not able to care
for themselves, and extends to those social objectives which promote the general welfare and
would be served by the government in the absence
of philanthropic enterprises such as homes for the
aged. Historically, and well-nigh unanimously,
the courts have found homes for the aged to be
charitable institutions where conducted at cost or
less. They have also recognized that man, especially the old, does not live by bread alone; that
though he be able to pay for all material wants he
nevertheless may be dependent upon his fellow man
or the government to protect him from the haunting
fear of loss of all his property with resultant
poverty, fear of illness or other physical disability overtaking him with no one near to help,
fear of the loneliness arising from absence of
social contacts, fear of any of the tragedies of
old age where there is no one standing by to help.
The test is not found in the question of what
financial ability does the recipient possess, but
what are his needs, alleviation of which constitutes a worthy social value. We apprehend that the
financial test becomes pertinent only when the occupants of an old age home pay more than the cost to
the home of what it furnishes them.

(1) In the light of these authorities it
seems clear that a home for the aged which caters
to wealthy persons and furnishes them those services and care needed by the old and infirm, rich
or poor, does not cease to be a charitable institution so long as its charges do not yield more
than the actual cost of operation; that it does
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cease to have that status when the occupants pay
more than the cost to the home, thus resulting in
a profit and converting it into a non-charitable
institution.
Committee Recommendations
Senior Citizen Homes. The committee agrees that traditionally aid to the aged has been recognized as a charitable function
and that relief of poverty is not the only condition for qualifying
for a tax exemption as a charity. It is a matter of common knowledge that aged people require care and attention apart from financial assistance. Senior citizen homes do provide special services
and equipment. Among the services readily available for most
senior homes are: emergency medical care; temporary nursing services; central dining facilities; surveillance of residents to
insure their well-being; emergency alarms; specially designed facilities to assist the handicapped and the infirm such as wider
doorways, low shelving, handrails for bathtubs, and nonskid floors;
and finally site locations accessible to transportation, medical
services, churches, and other community activities.
The committee expresses concern, however, that instances
exist in which persons residing in senior homes are less than 62
years of age and are not handicapped. The committee believes the
law should be amended to prevent abuse of the concept on which
senior citizen housing is based. In other words, employed physically-able persons under 62 years of age should be prohibited from
taking advantage of this tax exemption. Therefore, the committee
recommends the following amendment to Section 137-2-1 (8), 1965
Permanent Supplement to C.R.S. 1963:
Property, real and personal, that is owned and used
solely and exclusively for strictly charitable purposes, and not for private or corporate profit.
SENIOR CITIZEN HOUSING SHALL BE CLASSED AS CHARITABLE ENTERPRISES AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION;
PROVIDED THAT SUCH HOUSING UNITS SHALL BE NONPROFIT
OPERATIONS AND THE PROPERTY REAL AND PERSONAL IS
DEDICATED IN PERPETUITY TO CHARITABLE PURPOSES; AND
PROVIDED FURTHER THAT THE HOUSING UNITS ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR ELDERLY OR HANDICAPPED PERSONS.
A SENIOR CITIZEN HOUSING OPERATION SHALL NOT BE
EXEMPT IF MORE THAN 5 PER CENT OF THE UNITS ARE
LEASED TO PERSONS UNDER 62 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT
HANDICAPPED. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SUBSECTION, A
"HANDICAPPED PERSON" MEANS A PERSON WHO HAS A PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT WHICH:
(1) IS EXPECTED TO BE OF LONG-CONTINUED AND
INDEFINITE DURATION;
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(2) SUBSTANTIALLY IMPEDES HIS ABILITY TO
LIVE INDEPENDENTLY; AND
(3) IS OF SUCH NATURE THAT HIS ABILITY TO
LIVE INDEPENDENTLY COULD BE IMPROVED BY MORE SUITABLE HOUSING CONDITIONS.
Other Charitable Activities. In viewing property tax exemptions for charitable activities (fraternal lodges, hospitals,
veterans' associations, etc.) the committee recommends that all institutions filing for a tax exemption be required to demonstrate
financial evidence of their charitable activities. The committee
considered recommending enactment of specific legislation requiring
institutions qualifying for a charitable tax exemption to allocate
a minimum percentage of fees, dues, donations, charges, and other
income to purely charitable activities. The committee, however,
did not have sufficient information on the financial status of
charities to develop a reasonable minimum standard. Therefore, the
committee simply recommends that as a condition for obtaining an
ad valorem tax exemption the Tax Commission require each charitable organization to submit an annual financial statement or tax
return to the Commission. The financial statement should contain an
itemized list of expenses including amounts spent for strictly
charitable purposes. Also, the committee recommends that the Tax
Commission, after analyzing such financial statements, report back
to the General Assembly with specific recommendations on more specific standards to be written into law regarding charitable exemptions.
Religious Exemptions. The committee believes that the intent
of the exemption for religious worship outlined in the Constitution
(Article X, Section 5) should be strictly construed. The Tax Commission currently denies exemptions for vacant land, miscellaneous
income property, and other miscellaneous property that is not
directly involved or necessary to the conduct of religious services.
The committee supports the rulings of the Commission on this matter
and suggests that the following clarifying language be added to
Section 137-2-1 (6), 1965 Permanent Supplement to C.R.S. 1963:
(6) Property, real and personal, that is
owned and used solely and exclusively for religious worship, and not for private or corporate
profit. THE EXEMPTION CONTEMPLATED IN THIS SUBSECTION SHALL BE LIMITED TO ANY BUILDING OR
EDIFICE IN WHICH RELIGIOUS WORSHIP IS CONDUCTED,
AND ANY LAND WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO MEET ZONING
STANDARDS AND BUILDING REQUIREMENTS, OR PROVIDE
PARKING.
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TAX EXEMPT PRQPERTY
A study of tax exempt property was initiated in the 1963-64
biennium under a Legislative Council Committee on Tax Exempt Property. At the direction of the committee, the first two years were
devoted to an inventory of all tax exempt property in Colorado and
preempted an opportunity for the committee to spend needed time to
review possible changes in constitutional or statutory provisions.
H.J.R. 1024, 1965 session, specifically directed the committee to review possible clarification or changes in the constitution
and statutes relating to tax exempt property; needed improvement
in the administration of the statutes; an:i revision of the system
of keeping public records on exemptions heretofore granted, as well
as current exemptions. The Committee on Tax Exempt Property ~stablished two phases for the study of property tax exemptions:
1) the 1965 interim study period was devoted to a review of public
propertn and 2) the committee utili~ed the 1966 interim for a review of private educational, religious, and charitable properties.
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR PUBLIC PROPERTIES
Since the adoption of Colorado's Constitution, there has
been a provision exempting public property from ad valorem taxes.
This provision has remained unchanged since enactment of the Constitution and ~eads as follows:
The property, real and personal, of the state,
counties, cities, towns and other municipal
corporations and public libraries, shall be
exempt from taxation.
Article X, Section 4, Colorado Constitution, according to decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court, means that ownership is the
only factor to be considered in determining whether public property is exempt from property taxes. For example, in Stewart v.
City and County of Denver ( 921), 70 Colo. 514, the court held:
According to the express language of the
constitution, there is but one condition essential to their (the land's) exemption from taxation, and that is ownership by the city.
In this case the exemption from taxation of
the property of cities is so clear and expressive
that there would seem to be no room for any doubt,
or necessity of resorting to any rule of construction. The exemption is absolute, and depends upon
no condition but ownership by the city.
Thus,the court ruled that regardless of the use of the property
or the fact that the property owned by one govermental jurisdiction is located in another jurisdiction, the properties of
the state of Colorado and local government jurisdictions are. tax
exempt.
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With respect to federal properties, no mention is made in
Colorado's Constitution of the exempt status of federal properties.
Colorado's Enabling Act (Section 4) provides:
••• , and that no taxes shall be imposed by the
state on lands or property therein belonging
to or which may hereafter be purchased by the
United States.
The impact of this blanket exemption for federal properties may
be minimized by recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, which will be discussed in detail in a later section.
Statutory Exemption of Public Property
The statutory provision relating to the taxation of public
property is contained in Section 137-2-1(5), 1965 Permanent Cumulative Supplement to C.R.S. 1963. This subsection, in accordance with
the constitution, exempts:
(5) Public libraries and the property, real and
personal, of the state and its political subdivisions.
The General Assembly made an unsuccessful attempt to require
the payment of fees in lieu of taxes on lands acquired by the Game,
Fish, and Parks Department in 1961, by requiring a school fee equivalent to twelve mills on such land. The constitutionality of the
fees on game and fish lands was contested first in the District
Court of Denver where it was declared unconstitutional, and later
that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado (Game
and Fish Commission of Colorado v. Cleland N. Feast, et al, N0:-20489, Colorado Supreme Court). In part, the court held:
"We are not impressed -- nor should we be -- by the fact
that the levy is labeled by the legislature as a 'school fee'
rather than a school tax. See Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400,
26 P. 2d 1051 (1933). In nearly all respects this section levies
a tax on State Game and Fish Commission property identical with
the tax levied in each affected school district on private property. Therefore, we are in accord with the trial court's statement wherein it said:
In our opinion, the legislation is an attempt
by the legislature to do indirectly what cannot
be done directly. It seems apparent that the
proposed fees are to replace the taxes that had
been paid by the individuals who owned the property before it was acqured by the Game and Fish
Commission. The fees, as shown above, are computed on an assessment based on the value of the
property. The statutes contain no element of
regulation or restraint pertaining to game and
fish laws whereby it could be argued that they
are an excise fee or tax. The legislation, in
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our opinion, is for th• primary purpose
of raising revenue. When this is the case,
the fee loses its character, as such, and
becomes a tax for revenue. Although, the
legislature uses the word 'fees,' the language of the legislature in denominating
the nature of a tax or fee to be assessed
is not determinative of its character. In
our opinion, the fee being computed on an
assessment based on valuation is a tax and
is in violation of Article 10, Section 4
of the State Constitution."
Constitutional Provisions in Other States
The exemption of public properties from taxation under
Colorado's Constitution is typical of the provision of the con·stitutions of at least 17 other states -- Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mi'ssouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma. Utah,
Virginia, and Washington. The remaining state constitutions
appear to be more strict in allowing property tax exemptions for
public properties. Some states -- Tennessee, Texas, South Carolina, and Wyoming -- limit property taK exemptions to property
used for a "governmental" purpose. A distinction between a "proprietary" purpose and a·"governmental" purppse is outlined in a
Wyoming Supreme Court Case -- Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board
of Equalization (1958), 333 P.2nd 700. The'court held that the
sale of electricity by a municipality through a municipally owned
electric plant is a proprietary and not a governmental function.
A tax exemption for a municipal electric plant in Wyoming was
denied on the basis of this ruling by the Wyoming cwrt.
The Wyoming Constitution (Article 15, Section 12) provides:
Exemptions from taxation. The property of
the United States, the state, counties, cities,
towns, school districts and municipal corporations when used primarily for a governmental
purpose, and public libraries, lots with the
buildings thereon used exclusively for religious worship, church parsonages, church schools,
and public cemeteries, shall be exempt from
taxation and such other property as the legislature may by general law provide.
The following statement shall be enclosed
in the foregoing proposed amendment by the
secretary of the State of Wyoming:
This proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State of Wyoming allows pro~erty
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of the Federal, State and political subdivisions thereof, to be subject to taxation in the event that such property is
being used for purposes other than governmental, in order that nongovernmental activities upon governmental 'lands can bear
their fair share of the tax burden within
this state.
The constitutions of the states of California and South
Dakota permit limited taxation of public properties under special circumstances. Article XIII, Section 1, California Constitution provides:
••• and further provided, that property used
for free public libraries and free museums, growing crops, property used exclusively for public
schools, and such as may belong to this State,
or to any county, city and county, or municipal
corporation within this State shall be exempt
from taxation, except such lands and the improvements thereon located o~tsid~ of the county, city
and county,or municipal corporation owning
same as were subject to taxation at the time of
the acquisition of the same by said county,
city and county, or municipal corporation; provided, that no improvements of any character
whatever constructed by any county, city and
county, or municipal corporation shall be subject to taxation. All lands or improvements
thereon, belonging to any county, city and county,
or municipal corporation, not exempt from taxation, shall be assessed by the assessor of the
county, city and county,or municipal corporation
in which said lands or improvements are located,
and said assessment shall be subject to review
equalization and adjustment by the State Board of
Equalization •••
The apparent purpose of the aforementioned provision is to
safeguard the tax revenue of small counties in which large municipal corporations purchase extensive holdings, and which, except
for the provision, would be exempt from local taxation.
On the other hand, the South Dakota Constitution (Article
XI, Section 5) provides that:
The property of the United States and of the
state, county and municipal corporations, both
real and personal, shall be exempt from taxation,
provided, however, that all state owned lands acquired under the provisions of the rural credit
act may be taxed by the local taxing districts for
county, township and school purposes, and all st~te
owned lands, known as public shooting areas, acquired under the provisions of Section 25.0106
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SOC 1939 and acts amendatory thereto, may
be taxed by the local taxing districts for
county, township and school purposes in such
manner as the Legislature may provide.
Minnesota's Constitution (Article 9, Section 1) authorizes
municipal corporations to· levy and collect assessments for local
improvements upon property benefited without regard to a cash
valuation of the property. In particular, the constitution provides for the assessment of public property, particularly state
lands, for benefits received from the construction of trunk highways.

The constitutions of the states of Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia state that public properties may be exempt from taxation.
In these states, the legislatures have the power to require the
collection of taxes on certain types of public properties. An
example of a state constitutional provision in this category is
Alaska (Article IX, Sections 4 and 5):
·
Exem~tions. The real·and personal property
of thetate·or its political subdivisions shall
be exempt from taxation under conditions and
exceptions which may be provided by law. All,
or any portion of, property used exclusively
for non-profit religious, charitable, cemetery,
or educational purposes, as defined by law, shall
be exempt from taxation. Other exemptions of
like or different kind may be granted by general
law. All valid existing exemptions shall be
retained until otherwise provided by law.
The remaining state constitutions make no mention of tax exemptions for public corporations with the result that the state legislatures in these states may, or may not, provide for the exemption of public properties from taxation -- Alabama, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Oregon, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.
Taxation of Leasehold Interests
A few other states have enacted legislation to permit the
taxation of leasehold interests in public properties. The Alaska
Constitution (Article IX, Section 5) specifically provides for tte
taxation of leasehold interests:
Sec. 5. Interests in government properta• Private
leaseholds, contracts, or interests in Ian or property owned or held by the United States, the State,
or its political subdivisions, shall be taxable to
the extent of the interests.
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The Michigan legislature adopted Public Act No. 189 in
1953, providing for a tax on the leasehold interest of property
exempt from taxation. This act included a requirement for taxing
the leasehold interest of federal property. Public Act No. 189,
1953 session, as amended by Public Act No. 226, Laws of 1962, follows:

211.181 Taxation of lessees and users of
tax-exempt property -- exce!tions.
Section 1. When any rea property which
for any reason is exempt from taxation is
leased, loaned, or otherwise made available
to and used by a private individual, association, or corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, except where the
use is by way of a concession in or relative
to the use of a public airport, park, market,
fair ground, or similar property which is
available to the 'use of the general public,
the lessees or users thereof shall be subject
to taxation in the same amount and to the same
extent as though the lessee or user were the
owner of such property. The foregoing shall
not apply to federal property for which payments are made in lieu of taxes in amounts
equivalent to taxes which might otherwise
be lawfully assessed or property of any statesupported educational institution nor to any
surplus highway property located in a city of
1,000,000 or more leased prior to June 10, 1953,
by the state highway commissioner or his designated agent where the original lease or its renewal did not provide for the payment of such
tax by either party to the lease, and where no
adjustment of the rental price for the land was
m~de in recognition ·of the provisions of the act.
211.182 Assessment and collection -- action
of assumpsit.
Section 2. Taxes shall be assessed to such
lessees or users of real property and collected
in the same manner as taxes assessed to owners
of real property except that such taxes shall not
become a lien against the property. When due,
such taxes shall constitute a debt due from the
lessee or user to the township, city, village, county
county, and school district for which the taxes were
were assessed and shall be recovered by direct
action of assumpsit.
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The United States Supreme Court in a series of cases handed
down in 1958 upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan act pro-·
viding for the taxation of leasehold interests in federal property.
In Citfi of Detroit v. Murray Corporation (1958}, 355 U.S. 458, the
court eld, in part, that " ••• We see no essential difference so
far as constitutional tax immunity is concerned between taxing a
person for using property he possesses and taxing him for possessing property he uses when in both instances he uses the property
for his own private ends ••• " The court made this distinction even
though the law does not specifically provide that the person or
lessee in possession of the property is "taxed for the privilege
of using or possessing" the property.
1

The Supreme Court also held that:
There is no claim that the challenged taxes
discriminate against persons holding government
property. To the contrary the tax is a general
tax which applies and has been applied throughout the State. If anythinq the economic burden
on the United States is more remote and less certain than in other cases where this Court has
upheld taxes on private parties. Of.course the
Government will eventually feel the financial
burden of at least some of the tax but the one
principle in this area which has heretofore been
clearly settled is that the imposition of an increased financial burden on the government does
not by itself invalidate a state tax •••• state
law specifically authorizes assessment against
the person in possession. And the taxing authorities were careful not to attempt to tax the
Government's interest in the property.
In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken the position
that a state may tax the private use of public proerty as long as
the state is careful not to tax the government's interest in the
property.
On the basis of this decision, perhaps it would be feasible for the Colorado General Assembly to levy an entirely new
tax on the use of public property. As previously mentioned, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the only condition for the exemption of state, county, and municipal lands from taxation isownership. However, this decision is based on taxation of property and not on a concept of a tax on "use." Of course, a question
r~mains as to whether the court would hold that a tax on "use" is
a mere subterfuge and actually is an attempt to tax the property
of the state, county, or towns. This latter argument may, however,
be minimized by the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Proposed Constitutional Amendment for Colorado
A proposed Constitutional amendment was introduced in the
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Colorado House of Representatives quring the 1964 session to permit the General Assembly to levy fees in lieu of taxes on state
and local government properties. The resolution (H.C.R. No. 1011)
was adopted by the House and subsequently amended by the Senate.
However, the amended resolution did not receive the necessary twothirds vote of all members of the House. The vote in the House on
final passage of the resolution was 41 ayes and 20 noes, with four
absent members.
A copy of the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 4,
Colorado Constitution, as outlined in H.C.R. No. 1011 follows:
Section 4. Public property exempt - except.
The property, real and personal, of the state,
counties, cities, towns, and other municipal
AND QUASI-MUNICIPAL corporations, and public
libraries shall be exempt from taxation, PROVIDED,
THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY . PROVIDE BY LAW FOR
THE MAKING OF PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAX.ES WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUCH PROPERTY.
Public Hearing. A public hearing was held on July 26, 1965,
by the Committee on Tax Exempt Property to review the merits of
the present property tax exemption for public property, as well
as to consider pros and cons of amending Section 4 of Article X.
The committee hearing on tax exemptions for public properties
revolved around three basic questions:
1) Should activities of government competing with private
industry support the property tax base of other units of government in the taxing jurisdiction? In other words, should a municipal electric power company competing with private power companies pay property taxes to schools and counties in the same
manner required of the private power company?
2) Should a governmental unit owning property in another
taxing jurisdiction pay property taxes to the taxing jurisdiction
in which the property is located? In such instances, is the payment of a property tax by a governmental unit to another governmental unit justified because of the erosion of the propertv tax
base of the taxing jurisdiction? For example, if a city.attempts to
provide recreational services for its citizens and removes a large
tract of land from the tax base of a small rural county, should
the city contribute to the tax base of the county to compensate
for loss in revenues?
3) In the event governmental property is leased to private
industry, should a tax be levied against the leasehold interest?
Since utilization of public property derives a profit to a private
lessee, should this interest in the use of public property be
taxed in a manner similar to that if the lessee actually were the
owner of the property?
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Taxation of Certain Public Pro erties.
At the pu ic earing on Ju y
a num er o suggestions were made
with respect to the taxation of public property.
1) It was pointed out that the present trends call for continued expansion of quasi-public functions or activies that no
longer are purely governmental in nature; for instance, a sizeable
number of municipalities maintain their own electric power services.
Recently, a bond issue providing for airport facilities and a
training center for air lines personnel was instituted in Denver.
Services of fire, police, sewage, etc., must be provided to all of
these facilities.
2) Large federal land holdings in Colorado limit the tax
base of many rural counties, suggesting that further loss of taxable property in these areas through the acquisition of tax exempt
property magnifies the burden of individual exemptions. Acquisition of lands to obtain water rights for cities, for example, erodes
the tax base of a number of rural cou0ties. Mr. Frank Steljes,
Park County Assessor, pointed out that approximately 60 per cent
of the land in Park County is tax exempt. The Denver Water Board
has acquired a total of 18,000 acre~ of land in this county, while
the ColoLado Springs Water Department owns approximately 317 acres
in the county.
3) The committee also was urged to consider that the burden
of support for the erosion of the tax base of a county through the
acquisition of properties by cities located outside the county
should be borne by the recipients of the benefits and not the property owners of communities in which the property is acquired for
. governmental programs. The demand of metroplitan communities for
recreational facilities, water, etc., in rural areas of the state
is in conflict with interests of rural property owners. If taxable
land utilized for ranch purposes is purchased by a governmental
agency for recreation, the land is removed from the tax rolls. Although the tax base of the county decreases as a result of the tax
exemption, local services and governmental expenses often do not
decrease in proportion to the reduction in the tax base, suggesting
the need for payments in lieu of taxes on property removed from the
tax rolls. In other words, the community acquiring the property
benefits from the tax exemption, but in so doing, a burden is placed
on the existing community to maintain police, fire, and other services for the exempt property.
4) The tax exempt status for public property used for socalled proprietary purposes such as electric power, transportation,
property leased for private or commercial use, etc., places similar activities of private industry under a serious economic disadvantage. Tax exemptions for quasi-governmental functions therefore
should be curtailed.
5) Is there a real distinction between "use" of property
and "use coupled with ownership?" In the event a commercial enterprise derives a profit through the use of public property, a tax
exemption on the property or the use of the property would appear
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to provide a tax advantage to this particular industry. The U.S.
Supreme Court recognizes and upholds this concept that a tax on
the use of public property levied against the lessee of the property and not the public owners is reasonable and proper.
Arguments in Opposition to a Proposed Constitutional Amendment. Arguments presented in opposition to a proposed constitution'aramendment to allow the taxing of ~rtain types of property used
in governmental activities include: 1
1) A tax levied on one governmental unit by another simply
results in a shift of public funds between governmental units, adding to the general expense of governmental operations. In the long
run, the public bears the burden of these unnecessary administrative
costs.
2) Public recreation sites owned by a governmental unit
and located in an adjoining county may provide recreational assets
not only to the residents of the county owning the property but to
the residents of the county in which the property is located. Furthermore, such a recreational site may stimulate tourist activities
in the area, actually enhancing the.economy of the community in
which the site is located.
3) The cost of local governmental services required by a
tax exempt piece of property may be rather minute in comparison
with the amount of tax money that could be collected from taxes
levied on the property, suggesting that, if a tax were paid on
the property, non-residents would be supporting the local program
to a larger degree than could be justified.
4) A reduction of revenues to a community as a result of
increased tax exemptions may be compensated for by collection of
monies from other sources. State aict or alternative taxes may be
utilized to reduce the impact to counties in which a reduction of
the property tax base has occurred.
5) Tax exemptions simply magnify problems presented by
uneconomical taxing units. Consideration may need to be given to
the basic organizational structure of local government to insure
that sufficient tax base exists for the support of local services.
EDUCATIONAL, CHARITABLE, AND RELIGIOUS
TAX EXEMPT PROPERTY
A substantial difference exists between Colorado's constitutional provision exempting public properties and the provision
exempting private real properties. Whereas th; exemption fo~
governmental property is mandatory,_the ex;mption for educ?tion?l,
reli~ious, and charitable property is conditio~ed upon legislative
considerations. For instance, Article X, Section 5, Colorado Con1.

"Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1965," Committee on Tax Exempt
Property, Colorado Legislative Council.
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stitution provides:
Property, real and personal, that is used
solely and exclusively for religious worship,
for schools or for strictly charitable purposes,
also cemeteries not used or held for private or
corporate profit, shall be exempt from taxation,
unless otherwise provided by general law. (emphasis
added)
Article X, Section 5, of the Constitution relating to tax
exempt property for religious, school and charitable purposes, has
been amended only once since the turn of the century. In 1936, a
provision was added to permit an exemption from ad valorem taxation of personal property utilized by religious, charitable, and
educational institutions. As previously mentioned, the General
Assembly has the power to limit exemptions in these areas; however,
the General Assembly may not extend tax exemptions to property
utilized for other purposes.
Statutory Provisions
The statutory language relating to educational, religious,
and charitable exemptions also has changed little over the years.
Section 2571, Compiled Statutes of Colorado 1883, provides: "•·•
fourth, lots with the buildings ~hereon, if said buildings are used
solely and exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for
strictly charitable purposes; ••• " This section was rewritten in
1902 with nearly identical language, and in 1921 the law was amended
· to limit the exemption for schools to those not operating for private or corporate profit (Laws of 1921, page 687). A definition
of what constitutes a school also was added in 1933. The most significant change in the language of the statutes applying to private
tax exempt.property occurred in 1964 (Chapter 94, Laws of 1964);
ownership was added as a criterion for obtaining an exemption from
ad valorem taxes. Under this new provision the commission denied
an exemption for a church used solely and exclusively for religious
worship, because the property was owned by a real estate developer.
Despite these aforementioned changes, the basic terminology of the
ad valorem exempt statute as it relates to private and charitable
properties, utilizing the words solely and exclusively, has remained
the same throughout Colorado's history.
Since the basic terminology of the law as it relates to private exemptions has been amended only slightly, the courts have concluded this to mean that the General Assembly approves the Suoreme
Court's liberal rule of construction. In this sense, it could
be argued that exemptions are granted and denied on the basis
of judicial determination rather than legislative determination.
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Duties of Tax Commission
Chapter 94, Laws of Colorado 1964, requires the Colorado
Tax Commission to examine and review applications claiming exemption of real and personal property owned and used sol~ly and exclusively for religious worship, schools, andc:n'aritable purposes.
If the exemption requested is justified in accordance with law, the
commission must grant the same. Assessors are prohibited from
granting exemptions in these areas. However, assessors are responsible for the partial exemptions for parsonages (a maximum of $6,000
of the valuation for assessment) and public property -- Article X,
Section 4.
Procedure. An individual or corporation may file a claim
for exemption of ad valorem taxes on one of three forms provided
by the commission -- 1) religious, 2) charitable, or 3) educational.
These application forms are designed to inform the commission of
the owner, address, legal descriptionl use, and related financial
statements concerning the property for which-an exemption is claimed.
Upon receipt of a claim for exempt status, the commission conducts
an investigation to substantiate the information contained in the
application. In other words, the commission must have actual proof
that the property is used for school, religious, or charitable purposes. Following the investigation of the claim, the commission
may rule on the taxable status of the property or simply request a
hearing with the claimant to develop additional information. In
some instances following an adverse ruling, the claimant or other
interested party may petition for a redetermination and request a
hearing before the commission. Appeal of any decision of the commission is made to the district court.
Claims for Exemptions. Since 1962, 1191 claims for ad valorem exemption have been filed with the commission. A brief summary of action taken on these claims follows:

Number of Claims Filed
Number of Claims Allowed*
Number of Claims Denied
Number of Claims No Action
Taken
Number of Claims in Process
of Investigation

*

1962

1963

340
146
49

264
181

1964

1965

303

284

200

48

218
58

20

15

15

5

125

20

12

22

Includes partial exemptions.
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57

The three classes of property for which the tax commission
is responsible -- religious, charitable, and educational -- may

be subdivided into specific categories for purposes of determining
the types of exemptions granted and denied by the commission. In
other words, all property owned by a religious organization does
not automatically qualify for an exemption. The property must be
utilized solely and exclusivela for religious worship. Therefore,
the commission reviews each in ividual claim to determine whether
it merits an exemption under the law.
Table I lists individual classes of property according to
use for all claims filed with the commission. Many of these claims,
once the use has been substantiated, obviously meet the requirements
of Section 137-2~1, 1965 Permanent Cumulative Supplement to c.R.S.
1963, relating to exemptions from ad valorem taxes. For instance,
a church building utilized solely for religious wor·ship certainly
qualifies for an exemption; similarly, institutions such as the
Red Cross and Salvation Army also appear to meet the conditions of
being used solely and exclusively for charitable purposes. However,
·in many instances the qualifying use·of the property is not clear,
and the Tax Commission has turned to Colorado court decisions, cases
in other states, and opinions of the Attorney General in arriving
at its decision.
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Table I
AD VALOREM TAX EXEMPTION CLAIMS GRANTED AND DENIED
BY TAX COMMISSION 1962 - 1965
Category
Religious

Exem~t Status
~ranteDenied

Use of Property
Religious Worship -- Churches, etc.
Instruction -- Sunday Schools
Churches -- Under Construction
Church Sites -- Vacant Land
Religious Only
Church Parking Lot
Church Parking Lot -- Used Commercial Purposes Weekdays

Miscellaneous Religious Activ!ties
Summer Camps
Convents
Retreats
Printing Operations
Student Centers (College, etc.)
Housing for Lay Teachers of Church
Schools
State Headquarters
Custodian Lives Rent Free
Church Playgrounds
Partial Religious Use
State Headquarters
Summer Cottage
Residences of Secretaries, Lay Assistants, Caretaker (Pays Rent)
Dormitory of Bible Students

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Vacant Building -- Church Owned
Income Property of Churches
Property Used for Religious Purpose but not
Owned by Church Organization
Religious Camps not for the Benefit of
Colorado Residents
Educational
College Summer Camps - Nonresident
Private High and Grammar Schools (Nonprofit)
Judo Club
American Institute Banking (Banking Courses)
Museums
Saddle Clubs
Westernaires (Museum)
Recreational
Placement Center for Private University
Theater for Nonprofit Theatrical Group
Playgrounds
-14-

x·

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

Table I

(Continued)
Category

Exemat Status
~rante
Denied

Use of Property

Charitable
Fraternal Organizations -- Masons,
Elks, etc.
Parking Lots
Income Property
Vacant Property
Used but not Owned by Lodge
Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A.
Social Clubs
Professional Organizations
Veterans' Organizations
Women's Club
Political Club
Hospitals
Staff Residences for Hospitals
Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc.
Planned Parenthood
Residence of Volunteer Social Workers
Community Centers
Charitable Foundation
Summer Camps -- Nonprofit
Used for Charitable Purposes -- Not Owned
Residence Donated -- Former Owner
Still Resides
Vacant Land
Unoccupied Building
Senior Citizens' Housing
Foreign Charities, etc. (Not for Benefit
of Colorado Residents)
Humane Association
Community Clubs
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X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

.

Review of Exempt Properties Granted Prior to 1962
Subsection 4 of Section 137-3-18, 1965 Permament Cumulative
Supplement to C.R.S. 1963, requires the commission to annually review the status of all property exempted from ad valorem taxes for'
religious, school, and charitable purposes and to ascertain whether
an exemption continues to be justified on individual properties.
To meet this mandate of the General Assembly, the Tax Commission
has employed Frank Eggers, an exemption officer, to compile a listing of all private religious, charitable, and school properties in
Cololorado. The commission expects to complete this survey in
about three years.
The Council staff's initial survey on tax exempt property
revealed that the exempt property records of the assessors were inadequate in all but a few instances. The listings of properties
obtained from the assessors in the Council study were turned over
to Mr. Eggers, and he is using this information as a starting point
·in developing information in each county. Eventually, a listing
of exempt property in each county will enable the assessors to develop detailed maps of all property_ in t_he county showing taxable
as well as exempt properties.
In the meantime, the Tax Commission has issued a number of
circulars to county·assessors to expedite review of exemptions of
a questionable nature. As early as 1961, prior to the time the
commission was assigned responsiblility for review of applications
for ad valorem tax exemptions, the commission issued Circular Number 2, 1961 Series, pointing out:
••• The assessor in his official capacity is
the authority in the determination of whether any
particular property is exempt under our existing
laws; if he has any reasonable doubt in the matter, the property should be properly assessed and
left in the roll until removed by court action instigated by the taxpayer.
Chapter 260, Laws of 1961, required the Tax Commission to
examine periodically all property in this state which has been exempted from taxation; to review applications for all new exemptions;
and to report to the assessors in writing their decisions. Circular Number 1, Series of 1962, issued by the commission called the
assessors' attention to 11 • • • 2) certain properties may have been exempted as being religious, charitable, or school, contrary to the
opinion of the Assessor. He can and should request that exempt
status of such property be established by the Tax Commission ••• "
Similar circulars have been issued in 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966.
In addition, in discussions with the assessors, the commission has
repeatedly urged assessors to require owners of exempt property
(in which there is a question of justification for a~ exemption)
to file for a redetermination of the exempt status of the property.
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In some instances, the assessors have followed up on this request
and have required exempt organizations to submit applications to
the commission.
Although the commsssion is authorized to examine indivi-.
dual tax exemptions in the counties, the commission has elected
to approach the problem through an over-all survey of the entire
property exemptions in the county rather than pick on individual
situations. As the exempt property surv~y is completed in each
county, the commission will make a redetermination of properties
within the counties.
·
Review of Selected Areas of Exemption
Granted and Denied By the Tax Commission
Senior Citizen Homes. In 1962• Congress enacted the Senior
Citizens Housing Act (Public Law 87-723). The purpose of the act
is to assist private nonprofit corporations, consumer cooperatives,·
or public bodies or agencies to provide .housing and related facilities for elderly or handicapped families. Following enactment of
Public Law 87-723, a number of charitable, religious, and trade associations negotiated agreements for the construction of apartment
houses for the elderly in the urban areas of Colorado. To finance
the institutions, recipients usually are charged a minimum rental,
as well as an occupancy fee {$600 - $15,000). The growth in nonprofit senior citizen housing in Colorado in ·the past few years
has been substantial, and total fixed assets of these homes are
worth at least $25,000,000.
Taxable Status. The Colorado Tax Commission has ruled that
nonprofit housing for the elderly may qualify for an ad valorem
tax exemption. However, the question has not been resolved since
litigation is underway in Jefferson County. A basic question exists
as to whether the residences actually are charitable, especially
in view of occupancy fees and monthly rental charges.
In any event, a brief outline of what constitutes a charity
may reveal the broad scope of charitable exemptions granted in Coloado and other states~
:
In Bishop and Chapter v. Treasurer, 37 Colo. 378, the Colorado Supreme Court listed a number of opfnions from other jurisdictions defining what constitutes a "charity" or a "charitable purpose."
In particular, the court includes remarks by Justice Marshall in
Harrington v. Pier, 82 N.W. 345:
A general statement of the essentials of a
charity; as regards the character of the work to
be performed, will substantially solve the ques~ion. It includes everything that is within the
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letter and spirit of the statute of Elizabeth~
considering such spirit to be broad enough to
include whatever will romote, in a legitimate
way! the comfort, happ ness and improvement of
an ndefinite number of persons. To that
extent, such statute is generally held to be a
part of the common law of states even that reject all the other features of it.*** The
general scope of the statue, considering its
letter and spirit, as before indicated, has
been judicially stated by judges of great learning, whose statements have come to be referred
to generally in judicial opinions as the true
test rather than the statute itself. The most
familiar judicial statement of the law, as recognized by the courts, is known as Gray's
rule, and is found in Jackson v. Phillips,
14 Allen 539, where the bequest under consideration was for the benefit of (ugitive slaves,
an object quite remote from any specifically
mentioned in the English statute. It was held,
nevertheless, to be within the spirit of the
statute. After discussing various views of
the term 'charity,' as applied to charitable
trusts, Justice Gray said: 'A charity, in the
legal sense, may be more full! defined as a
lift to be applied consistent y with existing
aws, for the benefit of an indefinite number
of persons, either b! bringing their minds or
hearts under the inf uence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to
establish tnemselves in life orb erectin
or ma ntaining pu lie bui dings or works, or
otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
It is immaterial whether the purpose is called
charitable in the gift itself, if it is so
described as to show that it is charitable in
its nature.' Another definition often quoted
was given by Mr. Binney in the Girard Will
Case, 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205. It is as
follows: 'Whatever is given for the love of
God or for the love of your nei~hbor in the
catholic and universal sense--given from
these motives and to these ends--free from
the stain or taint of every consideration
that is personal, private or selfish.' Perhaps
a more concise, comprehensive and practical
definition is that found in Missouri Historical
Soc. v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.
346, as follows: 1 Any gift, not inconsistent
with existing laws, which is promotive of science

1
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e u 1c convenience is a car
wt n
e
meanin~ o
e aut orit esf wet er so enom nated in the instrument wh ch evidences the ift
or no.
Anot er rue, capa e o
eing un erstood and applied by any person of ordinary
understanding, was given by Lord Camden in Jones v.
Williams, Amb. 652, and approved by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Perin v. Carey
24 How. 465, 16 L. Ed. 701, as follows:
'A gift
to a general public usefi which extends to the
~oor as well as the ric • 1 The theory of that
is, that the immediate persons benefited may be
of a particular class and yet, if the use is
public in the sense tfiat it promotes the ~eneral welfare in some way, it has the essentials of
a charity.» (Emphasis added)'

2. The ancient statute of Elizabeth. The preamble to the ancient
statute of Elizabeth (r), sometimes known as the Charitable Uses
Act, 1601, contained a comprehensive and varied list of charities (s)
and the statute made it clear that at least those purposes were
charitable (t).
·
The objects enumerated in the preamble (u) were as follows1
--The relief of aged, impotent and poor people: the maintenance of
sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning and free
schools and scholars of universities; the repair of bridges, ports,
havens, causeways, churches, sea banks and highways; the education
and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock or maintenance for
houses of correction; marriages of poor maids; supportation, aid,
and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed;
the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; the aid or
ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting
out of soldiers, and other taxes.
The list was not exhaustive (a); but to decide whether a
purpose is charitable or not in English law, it has since been the
practice of the courts to refer to the preamble to the ancient
statute of· Elizabeth (b). The objects there enumerated and all
others "which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and
intendment" are charitable in the legal sense (c). No other
objects are in English law charitable. Those named in the preamble, which has received a very wide construction, are to be
regarded as instances, and not as the only objects of charity.
The preamble to the statute of Elizabeth has been expressly preserved although the rest of the statute has been repealed.
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General statements concerning charitable purposes also
Ire outlined in Corpus Juris Secundum, 84 C.J.s. 544:
••• Charitable purposes include those the
accomplishment of which makes it likely that
persons affected will become substantial and
useful citizens and less likely that they
will become burdens on society. Social and
recreational activities of a club do not constitute a charitable purpose;
••• purposes purely charitable is broader
than mere relief of the destitute or the giving
of· alms; it contemplates activities not selfsupporting which are intended to improve the
physical, mental, and moral condition of the
recipients and make it less likely that they
will become burdens on socie·ty and more likely
that they will become useful citizens •
••• In order to be exempt as charitable
and benevolent, an institution should be operated without any element of private profit,
and must not be a money-making institution.
This does not mean that a charitable institution cannot charge fees or engage in business, •••
According to Black~s Law Dictionary, charity also may mean or
apply to:

Accomplishment of some social interest,
In re Tollinger's Estate, 349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d
500, 501, 502. Act or feeling of benevolence,
Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium of
Tucson v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458.
Advancement of purposes beneficial to public,
Rabinowitz v. Wollman, 174 Md. 6, 197 A. 566,
568. All good affections men ought to bear
towards each other·. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399. All which aids man and seeks
to improve his condition. Waddell v. Young
Women's Christian Ass'n, 133 Ohio St. 601, 15
N.E.2d 140, 142. Alms giving, In Re Rathbone's
Estate, 11 N.Y.S.2d 506, 527, 170 Misc. 1030.
Amelioration of persons in unfortunate circumstances, Second Nat. Bank v. Second Nat. Bank,
171 Md. 547, 190 A.215, 111 A.L.R. 711. Any
purpose in which the public has an interest,
Collins v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d
572, 580. Any purpose of general benefit untainted by motives of private gain. Stearns
v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 276
N.Y.S. 390, 395, 154 Misc. 71. Any scheme or
effort to better the condition of society or any
considerable part thereof. Tharpe v. Central
Georgia Council of Boy Scouts of America,
185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762, 764, 116 A.L.R 373
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185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762, 764, 116 A.L.R. 373.
Benefit of an indefinite number of persons, Mor1an
v. National Trust Bank of Charleston, 33r-11. 182, 162 N.E. 888, 890. Benefit of mini-

ster. In re Edge's Estate, 288 N.Y.S. 437, 440,
159 Misc. 505. Benevolence, philanthropy, and
good will. Santa Fe Lodge No. 460 B. P. 0. E. 1
v. Em~loyment Sec. Commission, 49 ~.M. 149, 159
P.2d 12, 315. Benevolent or philanthropic,
Beckwith v. Parish, 69 Ga. 569; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23. General Public use which extends to the rich as well as to the poor. Hamilton v. Corvallis General Hospital Ass'n, 146
Or. 168, 30 P.2d 9, 14. Gift without consideration or expectation of return, State v. Texas
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 51
S.W.2d 405, 410. Improvement of spiritual,
mental, social and physical conditions. Andrews
v. Young Men's Christian Ass~n of Des Moines,
226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, 192. Le~sening
burdens of government. Stork v. Schmidt, 129
Neb. 311, 261 N.W. 552, 554~ Physical, mental
or moral betterment. In re Tollinger's Estate,
349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 500, 501, 502. Promotion
of happiness of man. Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Welch, u.C.Mass., 25 F.Supp. 45, 48. Promotion
of philanthropic and humanitarian purposes.
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, Mass., 556.
Promotion of well-doing and well-being of social
man. Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370
Ill. 356, 19 N.E.2d 193, 199. Public benefit,
convenience, utility, or comfort, Cam! v.
Presbgterian Soc. of Sackets Harbor,73 N.Y.S.
581, 84, 105 Misc. 139. Reclamation of criminals. Religious, educational, benevolent, and
humanitarian objects. In re Jordan's Estatef
329 Pa. 427, 197 A. 150. What is done out o
good will and a desire to add to the improvement
of moral, mental, and physical welfare of public.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, D.C.Mass., 25
F.Supp. 45, 48. Whatever is given for love of
God or love of your neighbor, free from every
consideration that is personal, private, or
selfish. Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 128, 11 L.Ed.
205, appr. Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 35. Whatever proceeds from sense of moral duty or feeling of kindness and humanity for relief or
comfort of another, Doyle v, Railroad Co,, 118
Mass. 195, 198, 19 .Am. Rep. 431.
In summary~ as pointed out in St. John the Evan~eliit v.
the Treasurer of the City and County of Denver, 37 Colo.78, the
fact that a person pays for actual necessities, and compensation
to the institution does not exceed what is required for the successful maintenance of an institution, this does not render it less a
charity. Of course, the fact that an association is nonprofit also
does not qualify it for an exemption.
-21-

The California District Court of Appeals ruled in Fifield
Manor v. Count of Los An eles (1961) 10 Cal. Reporter 242, that
nonpro
corpora ons were entitled to property tax exemption for
property devoted to homes for the aged, although occupied mainly
by middle income persons who had been self-employed, and where
charges did not yield more than actual costs. The court concluded:
The courts have long recognized and declared
that charity is not limited to giving alms, is
not confined to relief of the poor, may extend
to the rich in areas where they are not able to
care for themselves, and extends to those social
objectives which promote the general welfare .and
would be served by the government in the absence
of philanthropic enterprises such as homes for
the aged. Historically, and well-nigh unanimously, the courts have found homes for the aged
to be charitable institutions where conducted at
cost or less. They have also recognized that
man, especially the old, does not live by bread
alone; that though he be able to pay for all
material wants he nevertheless may be dependent
upon his fellow man or the government to protect him from the haunting fear of loss of all
his property with resultant poverty, fear of illness or other physical disability overtaking him
with no one near to help, fear of the loneliness
arising from absence of social contacts, fear of
any of the tragedies of old age where there is
no one standing by to help.
The test is not found in the question of
what financial ability does the recipient possess,
but what are his needs, alleviation of which constitutes a worthy social value. We apprehend
that the financial test becomes pertinent only
when the occupants of an old age home pay more
than the cost to the home of what it furnishes
them.
(1) In the light of these authorities
it seems clear that a home for the aged which
caters to wealthy persons and furnishes them
those services and care needed by the old and
infirm, rich or poor, does not cease to be a
charitable institution so long as its charges
do not yield more than actual cost of operation; that it does cease to have that status
when the occupants pay more than the cost to
the home, thus resulting in a profit and converting it into a non-charitable institution.
Attorney General's Opinions. In 1959, Donald Kelley,
City Attorney for Denver, requested an opinion from the Attorney
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General on the taxable status of the Campbell-Stone Memorial
Residence (Memo No. 59 - 3341). Excerpts from Mr. Dunbar's reply
follow:
The Association of Christian Churches of
the Denver Area, Inc., is the owner of what is
known as Campbell-Stone Memorial Residence,
located at 1285 Race Street, Denver. The
Association formally requested the Assessor
that its property, land and improvements be
given tax exemption from ad valorem taxes under Sec. 137-12-3(8), C.R.S. '53 and Sec. 5,
Article X of the Constitution. Such request
was denied by the Assessor and the matter is
currently pending before the Board of Equalization.
The facts upon which request for exemption was based appear to be~The Association has made improvements
on the land which consists of a modern apartment building containing a·total of sixtyfive resident units varying between buffet
units, one bed room units and two bed room
units, together with a recreation room, sun
deck and sick-bay. The same is licensed by
the Department of Health and Hospitals of
Denver as an Institution for the Aged. The
units are leased only to physically able
senior citizens, who are approved by an admissions committee; and who pay an occupancy
fee of $600.00 (refundable on death or removal) and fixed monthly rentals of $48.00
for buffet units; $65.00 for one bed room
apartments; and $80.00 for two bed room
apartments. The tenancy is terminated upon
non-payment of the agreed rental, except
that the Association states that it has established a fund, arising from voluntary contributions, from which rentals due from occupants
who are without funds is paid. The rentals
charged are admittedly lower than the prevailing rental scale of like units.
The Association has filed with the FHA,
from whom a loan was obtained, a letter obligating it to assume and pay any deficit between
income and operating expense arising out of
the operation of said housing project.
Cl.JESTION: Under these facts does Sec.
5, Article X of the Colorado Constitution
and Sec. 137-12-3(8), C.R.S. '53 exempt this
property from ad valorem taxation?
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ANSWER: Under the facts as outlined in
your letter of October 26, and after an examination of the decisions applicable thereto it is
my opinion that there is ample authority and
grounds to support a judicial determination
in favor of a tax exempt status under Sec. 13712-3(3), C.R.S. 1963, and Sec. 5, Article X of
the Constitution.
More detailed facts relating to the operation of the Campbell-Stone Memorial Residence,
appearing in a brief submitted on the question
indicates that the residence is operated as a
non-profit charitable and.benevolent enterprise of the Association. The Association, a
Colorado corporation, was issued a corporate
charter in 1946, as a religious and benevolent
society or association and is not organized
for profit and has no stockholders.
From Kem~ v. Pillar of Fire, 94 Colo. 41,
decided in 19 3, we find the following:
"While the use of the property, and not
the character of the owner, is the test of
the right to exemption, the character of the
owner sheds an important side light on the
nature of the use."
In Lutheran Hospital Association v. Baker
(1918), 40 S.D. 226, 167 N.W. 148, it was said:
"The determination of the exemption in
a particular case seems to depend in the last
analysis, upon two things
First, whether the organization claiming
the exemption is a charitable one; and, second,
whether the property on which the exemption is
claimed is being devoted to charitable purposes.
In general, it may be said that any body not
organized for profit, which has for its purpose
the promotion of the general welfare of the
public, extending its benefits without discrimination as to race, color or creed, is a charitable or benevolent organization within the
meaning of the tax exemption statutes."
We note further that "the courts are
agreed that a charitable institution does not
lose its charitable character and its consequent
exemption from taxation merely because recipients
of its benefits who are able to pay are required
to do so, where funds derived in this manner
are devoted to the charitable purpose of the
institution." Hot Springs School Dist. vs.
Sisters of Mercy (1907), 84 Ark. 497, 106 s.w.
954.
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From the case The Bishop and Chapter of the
Cathedral of St. John the Evantelist v. The
Treasurer of the Cit~ and Coun y of Denver, 37
Colo. 378, 86 Pac. I 21, we have the"following:
"The only question, therefore, presented
for our consideration is, whether the exaction
of payment from the patients for the actual
necessities furnished, according t~ their circumstances and the accommodations they receive,
constituted a use of the buildings other than
a strictly charitable one. We think that it
has been uniformly held that, when such compensation does not exceed what is required for
the successful maintenance of the institution,
it does not render it less a charity."
The "Home" requires that its tenants pay
only a portion of their keep if they are financially able, and if they are not able to pay,
money is received from member churches as donations to carry on the work ·of the home and to
pay for those who are unable to pay.
From the alleged facts submitted in your
letter it appears that the residents of CampbellStone Memorial Residence, are all and may have
been for many years, residents of the State of
Colorado.
The "residence" meets the requirements for
tax exemption in the following respects:(1) A Colorado corporation organized as
a religious and benevolent non-profit enterprise, whose membership consists of the Association of Christian Churches of Denver.
(2) Furnishes a home for senior citizens,
at less expense to the resident of the home than
could be purchased elsewhere, any deficit being
made up from donations and contributions from
member churches.
(3) Result: The Campbell-Stone Memorial
Residence by its operation and care of senior
citizens is thereby relieving the taxpayers of
Colorado of the expense of caring for those
elder citizens who otherwise might sooner or
later become a charge upon the State for their
care and support.

The Attorney General issued a similar opinion in December
of 1960 -- 60-3464:
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Rocky Mountain Methodist Homes, Incorporated
is a not for profit Colorado corporation and owns
certain real estate in Boulder County and has constructed improvements, thereon at a cost, including cost of furnishings, of about $1,920,Q00.00.
The Boulder County Assessor proposes to assess
the improvements and land. The corporation
claims that this assessment is erroneous since
the lands and improvements are exempt from taxation under the provi~ions of Section 5, Article
X of the Colorado Constitution and Section 137-12-3,
1953 C.R.S.
The property is operated under the name Frasier Meadows Manor. The home is operated as a
home for elderly persons and is a project of The
Rocky Mountain Conference of the Methodist Church,
which Conference is the governing body of the
church for the States of Colorado, Wyoming and
Utah. The charter provides that the home is to
be a home for members or ministers of the Methodist Church and for older persons of good moral
character •••
For those who have sufficient funds a contribution is made depending upon the accomodations
desired. The accommodations vary from a single
unit at $8,000 to $18,000 for an apartment facing
the mountains. For this payment the accommodations are available for life. The units are
leased only to physically able senior citizens.
The monthly care and food charge is $125.00 per
month. The corporation agrees to care for a person on basis of old age assistance should funds
become exhausted. The corporation also provides
for special occupancy cases where people do not
have sufficient funds to pay the $8,000. These
contributions have varied from $25.00 to $1500.
Seven persons have been admitted as special occupancy cases and the total contribution for the
seven is $4,525 or an average of approximately
$650.00 each.
There is no fixed rule by which it can be
determined whether an organization is a charitable
one. Each case must turn on its particular facts.
It appears that Frasier Meadows and CampbellStone are similar in organization and purpose
with the exception that Frasier Meadows requires
a much larger occupancy fee ($8,000 - $18,000}
than Campbell-Stone ($600.00}. Frasier Meadows
charges $125 per month for the room, heat, light,
water, board, periodic room service and flat
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laundry service. Campbell-Stone makes a fixed
monthly rental of $48.00 - $80.00 with no provision for board.
It is my opinion that there is sufficient

similarity in the Frasier Meadows home compared

to the Campbell-Stone home to justify a judicial
determination in favor of a tax exempt status
under Sec. 137-12-3(8), C.R.S. 1953, and Sec. 5,
Article X of the Constitution.
In a letter to the Attorney General in January of 1963,
Howard Latting, chairman of the Tax Commission, also outlined problems
.posed by senior citizen homes.
As you are undoubtedly aware, Congress authorized F. H. A. financing of Senior Citizen Homes,
provided they were sponsored by certain types of
non-profit organizations.
In Colorado, such homes have been and are
in the process of being sponsored by churches,
church organizations, hospital associations,
and labor unions. Inasmuch as F. H. A. does
not provide one-hundred per cent financing,
second mortgages are necessary. If a Senior
Citizen wishes to avail himself, or herself,
of one of these apartments, he or she must pay
an entrance fee, plus a monthly rental.
The entrance fees will vary from $600 to
$7,500 generally, and the monthly rental will
vary from $60 per month to $135 per month generally. The entrance fee is geared primarily
to service the second mortgage, and the monthly
rentals are established after approval by F. H. A.
to service the F. H. A. loan. Thus, it would
appear, that the amount of money necessary to
provide Senior Citizen housing is provided by
the Senior Citizens themselves, and NOT by the
sponsoring organization; in other words, they
are self-sustaining.
At the present time, we are in receipt of
three separate applications for tax exemption
under C.R. S. 1953, 137-12-3(8) filed with us
for determination of eligibility under 137-3-5-9(2):
1.
2.
3.

Association of Christian Churches (CampbellStone)
Broadway Baptist Housin9, Incorporated
(Roger-Williams Manor)
Central Housing, Incorporated (CaneRidge Manor)
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There is no doubt in our mind that such projects
are commendable, however, there is some doubt as
to their eligibility for exemption under strict
interpretation of applicable statutes. Also, because this is a new concept, there is some question as to whether or not the matter should be
determined by litigation, rather than by administrative decision.
In answer to Mr. Latting, the Attorney General stated:
We have examined the papers submitted by the
Broadway Baptist Housing, Incorporated (Ro~erWilliams Manor), Central Housing, incorporated
(Cane-Ridge Manor), and Presbyterian Hospital
Association (Park Manor), respecting their
claims for tax exemption under 137-12-3(8) CRS
'53 as amended, and we do not see where these
organizations and their operations differ in
principle from the Association of Christian
Churches of the Denver Area, Inc.• , which operates Campbell-Stone, which was the subject of
our Opinion No. 59-3341 which you have, or
Frasier Meadows Manor owned by Rocky Mountain
Methodist Homes, Inc., which was the subject of
our Opinion No. 60-3464 which you also have.
We have also read the case of Fifield Manor,
·
and others, v. the County of Los Angeles
decided by the District Court of Appeal of the
Second 9istrict of California on January 3,
1961 as modified on January 31, 1961. From
this case and the other cases which we cited
in our Opinions No. 59-4331, 59-3346, and 603464 it is still our opinion that there is
ample authority to justify you in determining
that all of the above institutions are exempt
from ad valorem taxes under Section 137-12-3(8)
CRS '53 as amended.
Based on opinions of the Attorney General and Court decisions in Colorado and other states, the commission has approved the
concept of an ad valorem tax exemption for nonprofit senior citizen
homes.
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Churches Under Construction
In viewing the records of the Tax Commission, a number
of religious organizations have filed for exemption of church
buildings under construction. If the investigation of the property
by the commission, staff, or county assessor reveals that a church
actually is under construction the exemption is granted. The commission's decision is based on Supreme Court cases utilizing a
"liberal rule" of interpretation of Article X, Section 5, of the
Colorado Constitution and the relative statutes. It is interesting
to note, however, that Supreme Court members have disagreed over
the application of the so-called "liberal rule" of construction.
The depression of the l930's apparently was an important
factor in bringing this problem to the attention of the court as
well as being a factor in the liberal decisions of the court. The
issue of a tax exemption for churches under construction came before
the courts because there were lengthy periods during the depression
in which churches lacked finances to complete .their building activities.
·
-

-

For instance, in El Jebel Shrine Association v. McGlone
(1933), 93 C.334, the court stated:
••• a sufficient answer is that at the cost
of about $50,000 a cellar has been excavated
upon their premises and stone walls thereon_
erected upon which the super-structure of a
building will be erected as soon as business
conditions permit. Counsel for the county
treasurer evidently construes our constitutional and statutory provisions in question
as requiring a building to be entirely completed before the same can escape taxation.
There are a number of decisions in other jurisdictions to the contrary. A structure is a
building under the arson statute, although it.
is yet incomplete and unfinished. Commonwealth
v. Squire, 42 Mass. (1 Mete.), 258, 259. In
Scott v. Goldinghorst, 123 Ind. 268, 24 N.E.
333, the word "building" under the mechanic's
lien law does not mean a completed building •••
It would seem therefore, that the foundation
which the shrine association has made, or
caused to be made, upon these premises is a
building, at least a part of building •••• In
New England Hosp. v. Boston, 113 Mass. 518, •••
The court in that case said that inasmuch as
this admittedly charitable institution had
purchased the lots for the purpose of erecting
the building thereon, and was proceeding with
the preliminary measures necessary for its
erection, the land must be deemed to be occupied
for the charitable purposes for which the hospital was incorporated and was therefore exempt •••
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In the Shrine case, the court upheld the premise that an unfinished
structure is in fact a building and entitled to exemption.
This liberal construction was carried one step further in
a majority opinion of the Supreme Court in McGlone v. First Baptist
Church (1935), 97 Colo. 427. A religious organization razed a residence and garages for the purpose of construction of a church. At
the time of assessment the land had been cleared and was vacant, but
actual construction had not commenced. However, the court held that
clearing of the land was sufficient evidence of intent to build
a church and granted the exemption. Ex~erpts from the majority
opinion of the court follow:
J

••• In a recent case this court said: 11 The
courts of some of the states interpret such provisions strictly and others liberally. Our own
decisions unquestionably are liberal*** The
argument of counsel for the defendants in error,
which, in substance, is a plea for the adoption
by this court of the strict 'rule of construction,
which if approved, would be contrary to our previous decisions on this important subject, does
not meet with our approval, .•• "
••• The statute with reference to exemptions
is practically in the same words as the constitutional provision. It has not been materially
changed over a course of many years, from which
fact it seems logical to conclude that the people
of the state have approved the liberal rule of
construction adopted by the courts; otherwise
they would have taken action through the legislature to further limit the conditions under which
property of religious, charitable and educational
institutions may be exempt •
••• Based on the El Jebel Association v. McGlone,
Supra, in which the court held that a foundation
was sufficient to qualify as a building, the majority opinion stated: "There was no contention in
that case, and could be none in reason that the
foundation, which is all there was on the lot, was
used for strictly charitable purposes. Indeed
there was no contention that it was used at all."
The rule of construction that we applied in the
Shrine case was substantially this: When an admittedly charitable institution undertakes in
good faith to extend its land and facilities for
charitable work and evidences this fact by the
expenditure of money and the doing of work as
part of a program looking toward the erection of
a building to be used when completed for charitable
purposes, this is within the spirit of the constitutional and statutory tax exemption provisions •••
In effect we hold that the requirements of the
constitution and statutes are met if there is
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a bona fide continuing intention to construct a
building to be devoted to the specified uses,
evidenced by work and the expenditure of money
toward that end.
In the instant case, the court contended:
"It began work on the lots by removing a nineteen room house and nine or ten garages located
thereon and had completed this work only five
months before the assessment of which complaint
was made, work that was a prerequisite to building a church and a part of the building program,
just as putting in a foundation was a part of
the Shrine program."

dissented.

On the other hand, in a minority opinion, Justice Holland
In part, he said:
••• can liberal construttion go so far as to
bring into physical existence a building, or some
part of a building on a lot, when admittedly
there is none? ••• The Constitution clearly says
••• and does not say that the intention to construct a building to be used for religious worship exempts th.e real estate upon which it is to
be located, from taxation •••• If there was even
a doubt as to the meaning of the wording of the
constitution and statute applicable to the case
and it became necessary to indulge a presumption
relative to the meaning of the words employed,
the presumption is always in favor of the taxing
power. 61 C.J. 391, Section 395.
Chief Justice Butler concurred in the dissent.

Nonresident Activities
The Tax Commission has held that the property of a geology
summer camp for students of an out-of-state university must be placed
on the tax rolls. Similarly, the commission has determined that property used for other religious, charitable, and education activities
primarily for the benefit of nonresidents of Colorado may not qualify
for a tax exemption. In The Youn Life Cam ai n A Cor oration
Board of County Commissioners o Ca ee County, et a.
95
Colo. 15, the Supreme Court contended:
••• It would unduly prolong this opinion to
quote from other decisions which support our conclusion that it was not the intention of the
people of the state of Colorado by adoption of
its constitutional provision (Article X, Section
5) or by legislative act to relieve a nonprofit
foreign corporation, be it charitable, religious
or educational, of the payment of its general
taxes and thereby increase the tax burden upon
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its resident taxpayers where, as here, said
foreign corporation cannot fairly be said to
ease any of the burdens of the taxpayers of
the state of Colorado •••
••• While it is the policy of society to
encourage education, benevolence and charity,
we do not believe it to be a proper function
of the state to go outside its own borders
and devote its resources to the support of
education, religion and charity for the benefit of the human race. Such would be a
direct diversion of the state's resources at
the expense of its resident taxpayers •••
We hold that a resident or nonresident,
nonprofit educational, religious, and charitable corporation which is not using its property
in the state for the benefit of the people of
Colorado is not exempt~from the payment of
general taxes on property held by it' within
this state.
Fraternal Lodges
Although fraternal organizations organized for charitable
purposes are eligible for exempt status under rulings of the Tax
Commission, the commission has excluded clubs organized for social
purpose from qualifying for tax exemptions. For instance, if the
by-laws of an organization emphasize charity and social activities
are of secondary importance -- Elks, Masonic Lodges, etc. -- the
organization may qualify for an exemption. On the other hand, if
the social aspects are of utmost importance, the exempt status is
denied.
Many tax exempt fraternal organizations utilize exempt
facilities for various social gatherings and because of this their
exempt status has been questioned. In Horton v. Colorado Springs
Masonic Building Society (1918) 64, Colorado 529, the court stated:
The fact that these societies or their members sometimes give a dinner or a dance in the
reception and other rooms ••• in our opinion,
does not change the nature of the use of the
building •••• when a religious organization
serves a meal or lap supper in the basement
of its church, and charges for it, even for
purposes of raising money to meet a deficiency
in connection with its church matters, or to
be used in religious work, no authority has
every held that for that reason the church
building was not used solely and exclusively
for religious worshtp. The aims and objects
of these societies are charitable. The moneys
received from their members and otherwise,
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except sufficient to perpetuate their existence,
are devoted to charitable purposes; •••
••• The reading rooms, etc., in connection
with the lodge rooms, make them all the more
attractive and tend to increase the membership,
which in turn gives greater opportunity to
enlarge the charities performed. The dances
and dinners referred to are but an incident in
the social life of these societies; they are
not for gain or profit, although they may, in
so~ instances, add to the revenue and in the
end help to provide more funds to be used by
the societies in their charity work.

I

Cases holding that property used principally for the benefit only of persons in some
way related to the members of a society (an
artifical class as it is called) are not exempt have done so generally for the .reason
that the constitution or statute governing
the case provided that the ~har1ty shall be
a purely public charity •••• These cases are
not applicable to the question under consideration. Our constitution does not contain the
word "public" in connection with "strictly
charitable purposes. 11 (.Emphasis Added)
Dissenting Opinion. Mr. Justice Teller wrote a dissenting
opinion in the Horton v. Masonic Society case:
••• First, the decisions cited as committing
us to the rule of liberal construction do not
determine that such rule should be generally
applied in this jurisdiction, but only that the
•• irule should be modified as to the schools; •••
••• This affords no possible ground for
holding that the first floor of the so-called
Masonic Temple is exempt. The construction
there applied was, as the opinion states,
necessary to prevent a limitation of the exemption to the things which are absolutely indispensable to a school, and thus interfere with
its work. If is be supposed that a clubhouse
or social hall is indispensable to the main
purpose for which the Masonic lodges are constituted and property acquired, it is pertinent
to inquire why the great majority of lodges
have not and never have had club rooms annexed
to them?
••• Conceding, now, that by weight of
authority Masonic lodges are charitable institutions, and that the property used for strictly
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lodge purposes should be exempt from taxation,
it by no means follows that all of the property
here involved is entitled to such exemption.
How can it be said that the use of so much of
this property as is in effect a clubroom for
the use of lodge members -- with no necesaary
connection with the general work of the order,
relieves the state of any burden.
Under a simple social organization, with
a rapid increase of wealth and tax-paying power,
the question of exemptions was not of very great
importance; but, with increased complexity of
so~ial and political relations, and consequent
increase of public expenditures, it becomes
more and more necessary to widen the field of
taxation so as to equalize the burdens of
government.
It is clear that use of part of. the building
for noncharitable purposes puts that much of the
property in competition with all persons who
have property to rent for similar purposes.
Were the first floor of the building not used
for social purposes, the parties not thus using
it, must if they would have a clubroom, either
buy or lease other prope.rty which pays taxes.
No one would claim that property, used as is the
first floor of the building in question, and
separate from the building containing the lodge
rooms, would be exempt. That being so, it is
evident that the only ground of exemption is
its physical connection with the lodge rooms.
It cannot be said that the people, who frequent
the rooms on the first floor and enjoy its
privileges, are objects of charity. Doubtless,
they would resent such an imputation. Yet, if
as to them the first floor is not devoted to
charitable uses, it is not so used at all.
The court also approved the liberal rule of constructio~
of Count Commissioners of Rio Grande Count
Et al v:
a ef Masonic Association
926 , 8 Coo. 8 •
xcerpts
case ollow:
••• that plaintiff is the owner of 160 acres
of land in Rio Grande County, which tract is com~
monly known and designated as "Masonic Park" on
which are located three buildings ••• all owned by
the plaintiff and used for masonic purposes,
including fraternal, pleasure, and recreation;
••• It is admitted that the plaintiff's.
articles of incorporation provide, inter alia,
that the business and object for which the
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association was formed was to promote social
intercourse among themselves and associates,
and to acquire, hold, and convey real estate
and personal property, to borrow money for
the purposes of improving their property and
to have and maintain in the county of Rio
Grande, for the use of themselves and other
associates for the purpose mentioned, an
association or club house with all the appurtenances and belongings, and matters and things
of a club or association, as usual thereto.
Defendants contentions are that the use
of the property is not for strictly charitable
purposes; that ownership of the land has nothing
to do with the question under consideration;
that whether it is exempt from or subject to
taxation depends upon the use of the land and
the buildings thereon, and that the admitted
facts show that they are used for residence
or recreation purposes.
·
While the use of a ti~ct of land or park
with buildings thereon for strictly charitable
purposes may be unusual and out of the ordinary,
we know of no reason why they may not be so
used. In the Horton case, supra, we held that
the buildings and grounds were exempt from taxation, although the proof disclosed that the
first floor contained a reading room, a smoking and reception room, and another large room
sometimes used in connection with the others
for dinners and dances given by members of the
different bodies; that sometimes entertainments
were restricted to members and other times nonmembers were included, and that the society
maintained in the building a ciqar stand for
the sale of cigars, tobacco, and other things
to those privileged to be there. It further
appeared in that case that pl~intiff rented
the property t~ certain Masonic organizations
who were stockholders of the plaintiff in that
case.
Following the rule of liberal construction
adopted in this jurisdiction, it seems quite
clear that the property in question was exempt
from taxation. From the admitted facts, it
seems plain that the property was used strictly
for charitable purposes within the spirit and
meaning of the Constitution and statutes.
We think the principles announced in the
Horton case, supra, are applicable to the
facts in the instant case, and because the facts
!n that case were so thoroughly considered and
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the numerous authorities cited and reviewed,
we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the
matter here. We are of the opinion that the
mere selling of leasehold interests to Masonic
purchasers of certain lots of plaintiff's land,
upon which they erect their own buildings and
for their own use, is not sufficient to take
from plaintiff's property its exempt character.
Denial of Exemption to Social Organizations and Labor Unions
In at least four situations, the Tax Commission has denied
exemptions to social clubs~- Polish Club and Slavic Club for examples •. The commission after a review of the by-laws of these organizations has refused to grant tax exempt status on the grounds that
their charitable activities are only incidental to their social programs. Supporting the determination of the commission is the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in Denver Press Club v. Collins (1932),
92 Colo. 74. An excerpt from this case follows:
The sole and only question presented for
our determination is whether, under the facts
herein, the property of this plaintiff is exempt from taxation as being used solely and
exclusively for strictly charitable purposes •
.•• We have read the deci$ions and studiously
considered the entire records in those cases,
and do not belive that, under them, plaintiff
is exempt •••• The evidence offered herein
definitely establishes that plaintiff is a
social organization, and that any charitable
work done is incidental to the principal object for which the club is organized. The
fact that plaintiff's members, as individuals,
are public spirited enough to assist in raisirg
funds for strictly charitable organizations
does not inure to the benefit of_ the plaintiff, and does not make plaintiff a charitable
organization within the purview of our Constitution.
A review of the tax exempt records of the City and County of
Denver reveal that the Denver Press Club and the Denver Woman's Press
Club currently are exempt. It must be emphasized that current criteria for granting an exemption is that an association is organized
for charitable purposes. Those exemptions have not been reviewed
by the commission.
The Supreme Court also ruled against tax exemptions for
labor unions. In Lane v. Wilson (1938}, 103 Colo. 99, the court
held that:
••• we still adhere to the distinction
between a charity, and a beneficial society
whose beneficience is confined to the members,
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their families, dependents or friends, and depends upon the contributions made, not voluntarily
given, but assessed against the members. s~ch an
organization, we have described as "not a charity,
but a private institution for the mutual advantage
of the members."
Physical Training Clubs
It is interesting to note that the Denver Turnverein (athletic club) was granted an exemption by the Supreme Court on the
grounds that it is an educational institution -- Denver Turnverein
v. McGlone (1932), 91 Colo. 473, 15 P. 2d 709. The Turnverein ls
-Interested in promoting physical and mental qualities of its members.
In part, the opinion of the court states:
••• corporation not for profit; that it owns
lots in Denver on which ther~ is a one story
building and basement, equipped with gymnastic
apparatus, ••• its purpose, to which it conforms,
are to promote the physical and mental qualities
of its members and others who may comply with its
rules, ••• and whatever may be incidental thereto,
and to extend a charitable hand to those in need;
that its doors are never guarded and all wellbehaved persons, regardless of race or creed,
are welcomed to its classes and its charities,
not restricted to its membership, are as ex~
tensive as its funds will admit •••• It does
not appear that its members, or their dependents
or descendents, as such, have any claim to, or
right in, any of its funds, •••
We think that notwithstanding plaintiff's
charities are althgether worthy, its primary
objective may fairly be said to be educational •
••• In the case of Bishop of the Cathedral of
St. John v. County Treasurer, 29 Colo. 143, 68
Pac. 272, ••• Mr. Justice Gabbert concluded
provisions exempting property used for educational purposes are less strictly construed than
those exempting property used for ordinary gain
or profit •••• The court concluded that only a
narrow construction, doing violence to the intent of the people and legislature with respect
to, not to be indulged, would operate to defeat
the claim for exemption, •••
We conclude on the facts here that the
plaintiff is conducting an educational institution worthy of encouragement, and one coming
within the reasonable purview of the law making
property, such as it owns, and used as appears,
exempt from taxation. As we have seen, the
plaintiff emphasizes and teaches physical culture,
held generally to be an important element in
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educational development. As was said in Mt.
Herman Bo~s• School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139,
146 N.E.54: "Education may be particularly
directed to either the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest
and best sense it relates to them all."
••. If three institutions are organized -one seeking by a course of instruction to cultivate the mind, one by a method of instruction
to improve students' religious or moral conditions, and another to teach physical culture to
produce a better physical development, each
is an institution of education, as much as the
one at which the student can acquire the threefold knowledge. It is simply a matter of judgment or convenience, whether one shall furnish
all the opportunities for the acquisition of
an education or whether there shall be separate
institutions for that purpose •••
Following the Turnverein case the General Assembly enacted
legislation clarifying what may be considered a school. At the
time of the Turnverein case, .the law listing properties qualifying
foi exemption provided:
••• grounds with buildings thereon, if said
buildings are used exclu~ively for schools,
other than schools held or conducted for private
or corporate profit. (Laws of 1921, page 687).
The law was amended in 1933 to provide:
(3) The property real and personal, that is
held exclusively for schools other than schools
held or conducted for private or corporate profit. School is hereby defined to mean an educational institution requiring daily attendance,
having a curriculum comparable to a grade, grammar school, junior high, high school or college
or any combination thereof and having an enrollment of at least forty students and charging a
tuition fee.
Although it would appear that statutory amendments subsequent to the Turnverein decision negate this decision,. Webster's
New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, points
out that in the usual sense-curriculum mean~:
The whole body of courses offered in an
educational institution, or by a department
thereof. On the other hand, strictly speaking,
curriculum means "A course; especially, a specified fixed course of study, as in a school or
college, a~ one leading to a degree."
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Under the aforementioned definition schools or other nonprofit organizations offering individual courses could qualify for tax exemptions.
For-this reason the Denver Judo Club, the Westernaires (Jefferson
County Saddle Club), the American Institute of Banking, etc., were
granted tax exemptions by the commission.
Parking Facilities
The Supreme Court's liberal rule of construction as emphasized in the preceding paragraphs again suggests that the use of
parking facilities for; church services is essential to the present
day conduct of a religious program. As long as the parking lots
are used solely and exclusively for religious services the exemption
'is granted. However, if the parking lot is leased on weekdays for
commercial parking the exemption is lost.
Perhaps a Supreme Court case that best illustrates the
concept of the liberal rule of construction as applied to the exemption of property directly related to the principle function for
which the exemption is granted is Horton v. Fountain Valley School
(1936), 98 Colo. 480.
In this instance, the Court stated:
••• There is no contention that the school
here concerned does not come within the above
statutory definition, and the trial court apparently so found; also that acreage or ·grounds to
the extent of approximately 175 acres were used
in connection with the operation of the school
and therefore exempt. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court necessarily had to,
and did, determine that the school was not held
or conducted for private or corporate profit.
On each of these questions the court's finding
is amply supported by the evidence and therefore will not be disturbed.
Having affirmed the judgment of the trial
court to this end, it is needless to discuss
the question of the exemption or taxability of
the residue of the land, other than to determine whether or not it is used in connection
with the school as such. There is no constitutional limitation as to the number of lots that
may be held by schools; neither is there any
statutory limitation as to the extent of grounds,
as such term is used in the statute, that may
be used in connection with schools •
••• in Bishop, etc. v. Treasurer, 29 Colo.
143, 68 Pac. 272, if the use of property utilized
for a school is limited to that which is indispensable for this purpose, the extent to which
institutions of this character are benefited
by exemption from taxation is confined to the
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narrowest possible limits, and every use which
could be dispensed with and yet permit a school
to be conducted which might be so termed in
name, would subject the property so used to
taxation. Such a co~struction would be too
narrow, and fall far short of expressing the
intent of the people and legislature with respect to schools. The fundamental object of
the law was to exempt property used for school
purposes from taxation. . .. the uses permissible
must necessarily embrace all which are proper
and appropriate to effect the objects of the
institution claiming the benefits of the exemption • • . • The constitutions and statutes mention
no particular or specific character of use, and
all requirements are met if a use is for the
purposes fostered for exemption. The taxing
authorities admit a use by c-0ntending that the
use is insignificant. It is not for them to
measure a use. Neither is it for them to conjecture whether or not the _institution might
at some time become a profit-making enterprize ••.
The school, to obtain exemption for present use,
was not required to allege further. If a pecuniary benefit is ever derived from a profit resulting from the operation of the school, a violation
of its charter then would be imminent .••
Vacant Lands
The Tax Commission has consistently denied granting tax
exempt status to vacant lands owned by religious and charitable
institutions. In many instances, religious organizations have
obtained a site for a church and filed for an exemption with the
Tax Commission. Although the land has been purchased for the
location of a church or charitable building and architects plans
have been filed, etc., for construction of the building, the Tax
Commission still has denied exemption.
The commission's position has been substantiated by the
Supreme Court in Denver v. George Washington Lodge Association (1950),
121 Colo. 470. In this instance, the court commented on the traditional liberal interpretation of the Constitution that the court has
held concerning tax exempt property, pointing out that churches or
charitable buildings under construction have been held to be tax
exempt. However the Supreme Court could not concur in an exemption
granted for vacant property in which a building is to be constructed
at a future date. In part, the court stated:
.•. In the present case, we are asked to go
one step further and hold that the mere purchase
under contract of a vacant property, with general
intent at some future date to erect thereon a
building to be used for a charitable purpose,
would, by some legal fiction, create both a
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building and establish its present use for a
strictly charitable purpose. It is not surprising, in view of the former decisions of this
court, that the trial court so held. However, a
departure is nonetheless a departure because it
is made step by step, and it appears high time
for this court to determine, ·not merely how far
we have departed from the last departure, but
whether we have departed from the requirements
of the statute itself. That statute does not
exempt lots intended as building sites if the
buildings to be erected are intended to be used
for strictly charitable purposes, but only lots
with the buildings thereon if said buildings are
used for strictly charitable purposes. When,
as here, there is neither the present ~haritable
use nor the vestige of a building in which such
use might be carried on, there d~pears to be no
possible basis for exemption~ exc~pt sympathy for
a purpose which we may regard as commendable •
••• In deciding the El Jebel case more than
sixteen years ago, this court took judicial notice
of the fact that the existence of a world-wide
depression had prevented the completion of many
similar buildings. Today we cannot be blind to
the fact that the property there involved, situated in close proximity to the State Capitol
grounds, remained through many years unused for
any purpose, the building still incomplete, the
property exempt from taxation and the original
intent long obscured.
Staff Residences for Hospital
The Tax Commission has granted exemptions for staff residences owned by a hospital and located in close proximity to the
institution. Perhaps the reason for the exemption is that hospital
personnel are subject to eme gency calls and must live within a few
1
minutes travel time of the hospital.
The Supreme Court's decision
in the Bishop and Chapter v. Treasurer of Arapahoe Countfi (1902),
29 Colo. l43, may reflect to some degree the basis forte commission's action. In this situation, the Treasurer of Arapahoe County
denied an exemption on real estate known as Matthews Hall, because
the building was utilized as a residence for the bishop of the diocese.
The exemption was claimed for educational purposes, and the school
was conducted in Matthews Hall under the direction of the bishop.
The Supreme Court held:
.••• The occupation by the bishop is in conformity with the conditions upon which part of
the funds used for the purchase of the ~remises
were given. He occupies these premises in his
official capacity as chief instructor of the
school. In this capacity his presence resulting
from residence is required. He is actually an
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instructor; his object in occupying the premises
is to discharge his duties in that capacity;
hence his dominant purpose in residency at the
hall is to carry out the objects of the institution, and it is this purpose which gives
character to the use by him.
Although the residences are not located on the grounds of
the hospital, the commission apparently expanded the concept outlined in the Bishop of the Cathedral of St. John case because the
residences are essential to the operation of the hospital.
This same analogy also could be applied to ad valorem
exemptions granted for staff residences of volunteer social workers,
campus night watchman for a women's college, etc.

-42-

Summary of the Problem of Private Ad Valorem Exemptions
The exemptions granted by the Tax Commission have followed
very closely the Supreme Court's basic premise that constitutional
and statutory provisions for ad valorem exemptions-for charitable,
religious, and school property should be liberally interpreted.
That is, if the property is needed in the actual conduct of a
church program, a qualifyina educational activity, or charity,
the property is entitled to an ad ,valorem tax exemption •. Thus,.
although a church parking lot is not used solely and exclusively
for religious worship, the parking lot is considered essential to
the conduct of the affairs of the church and should be granted an
exemption.
The courts and the Commission also have expanded the liberal rule of construction to include organizations that are selfsupporting--senior citizen homes, for example. The mere fact that
fees, charges, or rents finance construction and maintenance of
a piece of property is not sufficient grounds for denying an exemption. In other words, a charity does not necessarily mean .
"pauperism," or economic dependence-on private or governmental
welfare. Assistance and comfort to the aged, regardless of their
financial means, constitutes a charity according to numerous court
decisions in other jurisdictions. With this in mind, it would
appear that the charitable nature of senior citizen homes, hospitals,
etc., is lost only when the institution derives a profit from its
operation.
·
The Supreme Court and the Commission have considered "use••
of property as the critical factor in the determination of whether
the "liberal rule" of construction should apply.· If a private institution that is entitled to an exemption owns property that is
not in use, or from which income is derived, the courts and the
Tax Commission have concluded that the property is not entitled to
an exemption.
The Issue
Since there has been little change in the constitution and
statutes, as they relate to private tax exemptions, members of the
Commission, Colorado Municipal League, etc., have commented that
the increased growth of various nonprofit enterprises, particularly
senior citizen homes, etc., is eroding the property tax: base of local governments, while, at the same time, adding to the burden of
county, city, town and special district services. Whether or not
an institution is a chari tv mav not be the real issue at_ stake.
Rather, the question is: "At what level of government are charities, religious in.sti tutions and private schools to be supported?"
After all, a tax exemption, as expressed by Ray Carper, Tax Commissioner, at the June 9, 1965 meeting of the committee, "is a subsidy paid for by the owners of taxable property." The property ta~
primarily is a local government tax, and it follows that an institution deriving benefit through a subsidy at the local level actually is
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supported by this level of government. This raises the fundamental
question of whether local governments should bear the burden of private exemptions.
On the other hand, property tax relief is a simple and economical means to encourage desirable activities that may enhance the
community and reduce the burden of government. If property tax relief for senior citizens is a worthwhile endeavor, because many
of these individuals are living on moderate fixed incomes, should
not the exemption apply to all elderly persons? Realizing that a
broadening of the tax exempt base will add to the probems of local
government, the impact of these ~xemptions .to local govetnment~
may be reduced by alternate forms of financing. Furthermore, state
assistance to local governmen:t: rnay be a more practical approach to
encouraginq charitable and religious activ.it:tes than trying to determine individually, by some form of direct subsidy, which activities should be encouraged and which should not.
In summary, a review of tax exemptions not only entails a
determination of the worthiness of an activity a'nd whether the program needs to be encouraged financially by government action, but
consideration needs to be given to the means for financing the governmental subsidy as well as the level of government that is to bear
the burden of the subsidy.
Periodic review of the following basic questions may be helpful:
1) Should the statutory definitions of educational, religious,
and charitable purposes be made more strict?
2) If current exemptions are to be encouraged, should local
government bear the entire cost of the subsidy?
3) Based on the trend of ever increasing erosion of the ad
valorem tax base, are local governments in need of developing alternative sources of revenue?
4) Should exempt institutions pay fees in lieu of taxes or
nonschool taxes to finance the cost of services rendered to the tax
exempt properties?
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